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Abstract
We study dynamic matching in an infinite-horizon stochastic market. While all agents are
potentially compatible with each other, some are hard-to-match and others are easy-to-match.
Agents prefer to be matched as soon as possible and matches are formed either bilaterally or
indirectly through chains. We adopt an asymptotic approach and compute tight bounds on the
limit of waiting time of agents under myopic policies that differ in matching technology and
prioritization.
We find that the market composition is a key factor in the desired matching technology and
prioritization level. When hard-to-match agents arrive less frequently than easy-to-match ones
(i) bilateral matching is almost as efficient as chains (waiting times scale similarly under both,
though chains always outperform bilateral matching by a constant factor), and (ii) assigning
priorities to hard-to-match agents improves their waiting times. When hard-to-match agents
arrive more frequently, chains are much more efficient than bilateral matching and prioritization
has no impact.
We further conduct comparative statics on arrival rates. Somewhat surprisingly, we find
that in a heterogeneous market and under bilateral matching, increasing arrival rate has a non-
monotone effect on waiting times, due to the fact that, under some market compositions, there
is an adverse effect of competition. Our comparative statics shed light on the impact of merging
markets and attracting altruistic agents (that initiate chains) or easy-to-match agents.
This work uncovers fundamental differences between heterogeneous and homogeneous dy-
namic markets, and potentially helps policy makers to generate insights on the operations of
matching markets such as kidney exchange programs.
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the problem of matching in a dynamic marketplace, where hetero-
geneous agents arrive over time to the market looking to exchange an indivisible item for another
compatible item. A key feature of the market is its exogenous thickness, as determined by the
types of agents and their arrival rates to the marketplace. For example, in kidney exchange some
patient-donor pairs are very hard-to-match while others are very easy-to-match. In online labor
markets, employers have different qualification requirements and workers have different skills.
Efficiency is determined by the matching policy and the matching technology. The former
determines which exchanges to be implemented and when, and in particular which priorities, to
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assign to different types of agents. The latter determines the forms of matches that can take
place; For example, while kidney exchanges were first conducted through bilateral exchanges (2-way
cycles) (Roth et al. (2005)), multi-hospital platforms are now facilitating many of their transplants
through chains initiated by altruistic donors (Anderson et al. (2015)). In many matching markets,
such as dating, only bilateral matches take place.
We are interested in the behavior of simple myopic policies under different matching technologies
and different thickness levels of the market. Myopic policies form matches as soon as they become
available, but may vary with respect to how they prioritize agents in the events of ties. Our
framework will allow to discuss policy questions such as: What is the effect of prioritizing different
types of agents? How does disproportional change in arrival of different types influence market
efficiency? What is the impact of merging matching marketplaces with different thickness levels on
different types?
Two comments are in place. First, restricting attention to myopic policies is motivated by
current practices in kidney exchange platforms in the United States. Ashlagi et al. (2017) uses
simulations based on empirical data from multiple exchange programs to show matching myopically
is nearly harmless. Moreover, a similar conclusion is also arrived in theoretical work Anderson
et al. (2017). 1 While they consider a stylized model with homogeneous agents, their result can
be generalized to our heterogeneous model.2 Second, the literature on dynamic matching in sparse
environments has focused on homogeneous agents (Anderson et al. (2017); Akbarpour et al. (2014)).
The motivation for this paper stems from the heterogeneity of agents in the marketplace.
For our purposes we propose a simple infinite-horizon model with two types of agents, easy-to-
match (E) and hard-to-match (H). Agents of each type T arrive to the marketplace according to
an independent Poisson process with rate λT . Each agent arrives with an indivisible item that she
wishes to exchange. We assume a stochastic demand structure, where each agent of type T finds the
item of any other agent compatible independently with probability pT . A key feature of the model
is that pH is significantly smaller than pE . Agents are indifferent between compatible items but
prefer to be matched as early as possible. Moreover, agents in our model depart the market after
being matched. We therefore adopt the average waiting time of agents in steady-state as a measure
for efficiency.3 While our model is highly stylized, it captures some important features observed in
kidney exchange pools (see Section 2.1, where we provide a brief background that further motivates
this study).
Two settings are considered, distinguished by how matchings are formed (feasible exchanges):
bilateral (2-way cycles), and chains. Our main findings are the following. First, we find that
market thickness plays a crucial role on the desired matching technology; when easy-to-match
agents arrive more frequently to the market than hard-to-match ones, the average waiting time
of H agents scales similarly under chains and bilateral matchings. But there is a sharp increase
in the average waiting time of H agents as soon as hard-to-match agents arrive more frequently,
highlighting the importance of chains in marketplaces with a majority of hard-to-match agents.
Second, we find that, under bilateral matching, increasing arrival rates of hard-to-match agents may
negatively affect hard-to-match agents by increasing their waiting times. Under chains, however,
increasing arrival rates always shortens waiting times. Third, impact of prioritization in bilateral
1See Subsection 1.1 for further details.
2This is not the focus of this paper, but for completeness, we show this in Appendix G.
3More precisely, we focus on the average waiting time of H agents, because the waiting time of E agents is
negligible compared to that of H agents. For a more detailed discussion, see Section 2.
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matching also depends on the market composition; when hard-to-match agents are the minority
type, assigning them priority improves their waiting times. 4 However, when they are in majority,
such prioritization has no significant impact.
Next we describe our results more formally under the bilateral and chain settings. In our analysis
we compute the average waiting time of H agents under various myopic policies as pH → 0.
Bilateral matching. Two myopic policies are considered for bilateral matching, differing in the
type of agents they prioritize; While it appears natural to prioritize hard-to-match agents, it is also
interesting to consider the prioritization of easy-to-match agents as these may have better outside
options.5 We find that regardless of how agents are prioritized, when λH < λE waiting time scales
with 1/pH , and when λH > λE waiting time scales with 1/p
2
H . When easy-to-match agents arrive
more frequently, prioritizing H agents results in shorter waiting times than prioritizing E agents.
However, when λH > λE , the average waiting time in the limit is identical under both types of
priorities.
We further provide comparative statics for the case in which H agents are prioritized. Increasing
λE always decreases waiting times. However, the average waiting time is non-monotone when
increasing λH ; It has an increasing trend up to a certain threshold, which depends on λE , and
then it decreases (note that in a homogeneous model with only H agents, Little’s law implies
that increasing λH always decreases waiting times). These findings have two main implications:
(i) thickening the market by increasing arrival rates of hard-to-match agents can result in longer
waiting times depending on the existing arrival rates, (ii) merging two marketplaces with different
compositions, i.e. different ratios between the two arrival rates, may not be beneficial for both.
Chain matching. Under the chain setting, we consider policies termed ChainMatch(d) for markets
endowed with d altruistic donors who initiate chains that continue indefinitely. In a chain, each
agent is matched by (receives an item from) some agent, and matches another. Whenever the last
agent of a chain can match a new arriving agent, the policy forms a new chain-segment, which is
a maximal sequence of matches resulting from a local search, in which the next matched agent is
selected randomly while breaking ties in favor of H agents (so the policy does not always identify
the longest possible chain-segment, which requires a global search and may be computationally
hard). We prove an upper-bound on the average waiting time that scales with 1/pH for all positive
arrival rates. We also find that even in the regime λE > λH where the waiting time scales similarly
under both matching technologies, chains result in lower waiting times than bilateral matching.
We provide comparative statics over the arrival rates of both types. We show (analytically for
pE = 1 and numerically for pE < 1), that the average waiting time decreases when the arrival
rate of either type increases. When pE = 1, we further find that the average waiting time is
independent of the constant d. Similar patterns hold numerically when pE < 1. Finally, we are
able to compute the average chain-segment (which plays an important operational role for example
in kidney exchange). An increase in λE or d, decreases the average length of a chain-segment. In
contrast, increasing λH has the opposite effect.
Next we provide brief intuition for some of the main findings, beginning with why the market
4To be precise, theoretically we are only able to prove that prioritizing H agents leads to shorter or equal waiting
times (of H agents), however, numerically we confirm that such prioritization indeed leads to strictly shorter waiting
times.
5 In reality, agents may leave the market without being matched due to various reasons such as finding outside
options. Under a stochastic departure model, shorter waiting times correspond to fewer departures because both
quantities are proportional with the market size. We leave the rigorous treatment of a model with departure as an
open question.
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composition and the desired matching technology are tightly connected. Under the bilateral setting
when easy-to-match agents arrive more frequently, almost all hard-to-match agents will be matched
with easy-to-match ones resulting in a scaling of 1/pH ; on the other hand, when hard-to-match
agents arrive more frequently, many of them will have to match with each other resulting in a
scaling of 1/p2H which is the inverse of the probability that two H agents can match each other. In
contrast, matching through chains does not require such “coincidence of wants” between pairs of H
agents even when H agents are the majority. This results in a waiting time that scales with 1/pH
regardless of the composition. We further find that the heterogeneity in the marketplace may lead
to non-trivial effects when increasing participation; The intuition for why, in the bilateral setting,
H agents may be harmed when attracting more H agents to the market is that this leads to harsher
competition among H agents for matching with E agents (even though H agents can potentially
match with each other).6 We elaborate and provide intuition for other results throughout the
paper.
Understanding the impact of market composition by providing comparative statics requires us to
not only compute the scaling of asymptotic behavior of average waiting time but also to characterize
the exact limits. Such exact characterization in a heterogeneous model is particularly challenging
as we need to analyze 2-dimensional Markov chains. For bilateral matching polices, we directly
analyze the underlying 2-dimensional spatially non-homogeneous random walks. One of the main
challenges in our analysis is the need to jointly bound the distribution in both dimensions, because
applying methods such as Lyapunov functions or analyzing marginal probability distributions would
not result in tight bounds. In doing so, we prove two auxiliary lemmas on concentration bounds for
a general class of 2-dimensional random walks that can be of interest for studying similar random
walks that may arise in other applications. For chain policies, we first couple the underlying Markov
process with a 1-dimensional process where no E agent joins the market. Analysis of the resulting
1-dimensional Markov chain presents new challenges as transitions between non-neighboring states
happen due to the possibility of forming arbitrarily long chain-segments. However, we show that the
chain-segment formation process exhibits a memoryless property, which proves helpful in computing
the waiting time limits.
1.1 Related work
A close stream of related papers study dynamic matching in models, in which agents’ preferences
are based on compatibility, i.e, agents are indifferent between whom they match with (U¨nver (2010);
Anderson et al. (2017); Akbarpour et al. (2014)).
The impact of the matching technology is addressed in markets comprised of only easy-to-match
agents (U¨nver (2010)) (with multiple coarse types) or only hard-to-match ones (Anderson et al.
(2017)). U¨nver (2010) finds that short cycles are sufficient for efficiency.7 Anderson et al. (2017)
consider markets, in which all agents are ex ante symmetric and hard-to-match. They study the
waiting-time scaling behavior of myopic policies that attempt to match each agent upon arrival in
three settings of exchanges, 2-ways, 2 and 3-ways, and chains, and find that moving from 2-ways
6A similar effect happens in kidney exchange where O-A patient-donor pairs that cannot match with each other
compete to match with scarce pairs with blood-type O donors. Note, however, that in our setting all agents can
potentially match with each other; in particular this effect extends to sets of pairs that are blood type compatible
with each other, like O-O pairs, some of which are much harder-to-match than others.
7The findings by U¨nver (2010) thus provide a rationale for the static large market results (see, e.g. Roth et al.
(2007)).
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or 3-ways to chains significantly reduces the average waiting time.8 Our paper bridges the gap by
looking at a model with both hard- and easy-to-match agents and thus allowing for different levels
of thickness in the market. 9
The papers above also find that, by and large, myopic policies are near-optimal: U¨nver (2010)
analyzes a kidney exchange model with different types and deterministic compatibility structure
across types and finds that matching upon arrival is near optimal, even though some waiting with
certain types to facilitate three-way exchanges adds some benefits. 10 Anderson et al. (2017)
consider a homogeneous model without departures (similar to our model with λE = 0) and finds
that there is little benefit from waiting before matching under both matching technologies of short
cycles and chains.11 Akbarpour et al. (2014) consider a homogeneous model with departures and
finds that the optimality gap of the policy that matches without waiting remains constant as the
match probability decreases. Moreover, using data-driven simulations, Ashlagi et al. (2017) study
the impact of match-run frequency, and show that among polices that match periodically (e.g.,
every week or every day), high matching frequencies perform best. 12 This paper builds on these
findings, and only analyzes myopic policies that search for a match upon arrival of a new agent.
We elaborate on the relation to Anderson et al. (2017), which is closest to our paper. Studying
myopic policies under a homogeneous setting resulted valuable insights. Some insights, however, do
not carry over to heterogeneous settings like kidney exchange (See Subsection 2.1). For instance,
merging markets is often sought as a solution to improve efficiency. A homogeneous model predicts
that increasing arrival rates (or merging markets) will always decrease waiting times. In contrast,
we find that merging heterogeneous markets may not decrease waiting times for both markets.
The homogeneous model by Anderson et al. (2017) predicts very infrequent but very long chain-
segments. Our model predicts shorter chain-segments, which fits better empirical evidence (chain-
segments typically consist of only a few pairs). Further, we remark that some questions cannot
be addressed in a homogeneous setting; for instance kidney exchange programs attempt to attract
easy-to-match pairs (Ashlagi and Roth (2014)); but the impact of such an increase cannot be
investigated in a homogeneous model. As another example, exchange programs usually assign high
priority to hard-to-match pairs; effect of such prioritization cannot be studied in a homogeneous
model. Overall it is natural and important to study richer models in order to address relevant
policy questions.
Another stream of related research considers models of agents’ preferences that do not depend
only on compatibility. These papers find that policies that match without waiting are inefficient
(Baccara et al. (2015); Fershtman and Pavan (2015); Doval (2014); Kadam and Kotowski (2014))
since some waiting can improve the quality of matches.13
Our work is also related to the problem of matching multi-class customers to multi-class servers
studied in queueing literature (e.g., Caldentey et al. (2009); Adan and Weiss (2012)). In our model,
an agent can be thought as a pair of customer-server, and the compatibility between any two agents
8See also Dickerson et al. (2012b) that demonstrate the benefit of chains using simulations in dynamic kidney
exchange pools.
9Ding et al. (2015) study a similar two-type model in a static setting and quantifies the effectiveness of matching
through chains taking a novel random walk approach.
10See also Gurvich et al. (2014), who study a similar compatibility-based inventory control model.
11The waiting-time scales with the same factor with or without waiting before matching.
12Non-myopic policies have also been studied, for example Dickerson et al. (2012a) study forward-looking polices by
casting the dynamic matching problem as a high-dimensional dynamic program, and develop a heuristic to overcome
the curse of dimensionality.
13See also related results in queueing models Leshno (2014); Bloch and Cantala (2014).
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is probabilistic, thus we will not have a finite number of queues.
Finally our work is related to the online matching literature that study online matching in which
the underlying graph is bipartite and agents on one side of the graph are all present in the market
and only agents on the other side arrive over time (Karp et al. (1990); Goel and Mehta (2008);
Feldman et al. (2009); Manshadi et al. (2011); Jaillet and Lu (2013)).
1.2 Organization
In Section 2 we introduce the model, polices, and the underlying stochastic processes. In Subsection
2.1 we provide a brief background on kidney exchange further motivating our framework and study.
In Section 3 we present the main theoretical results and Section 4 complements the results with
numerical experiments. Section 5 outlines the main proof ideas and techniques along with the
details of Markov chains induced by each policy. Section 6 concludes. For the sake of brevity,
we only include proofs of selected results in the main text. The detailed proofs of the rest of the
statements are deferred to clearly marked appendices.
2 Model
We study an infinite-horizon dynamic matching market, where each arriving agent is endowed with
a single item she wants to exchange for another item she finds compatible. Agents are indifferent
between compatible items and wish to exchange as early as possible, their cost of waiting being
proportional to the waiting time.
There are two types of agents, H and E, referred by hard-to-match and easy-to-match, respec-
tively. Beginning at time t = 0, agents of type T ∈ {H,E} arrive to the market according to an
independent Poisson process with rate λT > 0.
Any agent of type H (E) finds the item of any other agent compatible independently with
probability pH (pE). Our analysis is asymptotic in pH → 0, while pE is a fixed constant. So, on
average, an H agent finds significantly fewer items compatible than an E agent. We say that an
agent j is matched by agent i, if agent j receives agent i’s item. An agent leaves the market only
when she is matched, i.e., she receives a compatible item.
We study matching policies in two different settings, distinguished by how agents can exchange
items. In the first setting two agents can exchange items bilaterally in a cyclic fashion. In the
second setting agents exchange items through chains; at time t = 0, there are d special agents
called altruistic agents who are willing to give an item without getting anything in return (all other
agents that will arrive to the market are regular agents who want to exchange their item for another
item).14 Each agent in a chain receives a compatible item from one agent and gives to the next.
At any given time, there are exactly d ≥ 1 agents who are either altruistic or received an item but
have not given their item. The latter are called bridge agents. We sometimes refer to altruistic
agents also by bridge agents. The transactions between two bridge agents in a given chain is called
a chain-segment. We assume that matches in a chain-segment are conducted instantaneously. A
policy is a mapping from the history of exchanges and the state of the marketplace to a set of
feasible exchanges involving non-overlapping sets of agents.
14Having altruistic agents is an intrinsic property of the market in the sense that some markets do not have access
to such agents.
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We adopt the average waiting time in steady-state as the measure of the efficiency of a policy
(the waiting of an agent is the difference between her departure time and her arrival time). In our
model, the average waiting time of one type of agents is equivalent to the average number of agents
of that type in the marketplace divided by the arrival rate of that type since these two quantities
are proportional to each other by Little’s law.
It is convenient to think about the state of the marketplace at any time in terms of a compatibility
graph, which is a directed graph with each agent represented by a node, and a directed edge from
i to j means that agent j finds agent i’s item compatible. Let Gt = (Vt, Et) denote the (observed)
compatibility graph at time t. When a new agent arrives directed edges are formed in each direction
independently and with probabilities corresponding to the agents’ types, between the arriving agent
and each agent in the marketplace. A bilateral exchange is a directed cycle of length two in the
compatibility graph and a chain-segment is a directed path in this graph starting from a bridge or
altruistic agent.
We study the following myopic policies, which attempt to match agents upon arrival.
Definition 1 (BilateralMatch(T) for T ∈ {H,E}). Upon arrival of a new agent, if a cycle of length
2 can be formed with the newly arrived agent, it is removed. If more than one such cycle exists,
priority is assigned to cycles with agents of type T . Further ties are broken uniformly at random.
Definition 2 (ChainMatch(d)). There are d bridge or altruistic agents in the market at any given
time. We describe first the policy for d = 1. Consider a new arriving agent i1. If i1 does not
have an incoming edge from the bridge agent then no matches happen. Otherwise, a chain-segment
begins with matching i1 by the bridge agent and advances as follows. If there are edges from i1
to other agents (not already in the chain-segment) one is selected, say i2, who is matched by i1.
Ties are broken randomly while favoring H agents. This disjoint directed path continues as long as
possible and instantaneously. All agents in the chain-segment leave the market and the last agent
becomes a bridge agent.
When there are d > 1 altruistic/bridge agents, if there is at least one directed edge from one of
them to the newly arrived agent, one of such edges is selected uniformly at random. As the process
moves forward, each altruistic agent eventually gives her item to an arriving agent and starts a
chain.
Under the ChainMatch(d) policy, upon arrival of a new agent a maximal chain-segment (path)
is identified through local search originating from a bridge agent. 15 Note that the chain-segment
has a positive length if and only if at least one bridge/altruistic agent has a directed edge to the
new agent.
For brevity we often refer to BilateralMatch(E), BilateralMatch(H), and ChainMatch(d), by BH ,
BE , and C(d), respectively. All the policies above are Markov policies, and thus define a continuous-
time Markov chain (CTMC). The following observation will allow us to ignore the edges within the
market when analyzing the underlying stochastic processes.
Observation 1. For each policy BH , BE, and C(d), in order to analyze the average waiting time,
it is sufficient to keep track of only the number of agents of each type in the market.
The observation is immediate for the bilateral policies BH and BE ; due to their myopic behavior
there are no 2-length cycles in the market except with a new arriving agent, implying that the
15Our local search chain-segment formation process bears similarity to Phase 1 of the two-phase clearing procedure
of Ding et al. (2015).
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corresponding Markov chains can be fully specified using only the set of vertices. For the C(d)
policy, the observation is more subtle. Note that under this policy there is no outgoing edge from
a bridge agent to any waiting agent, again due to the myopic behavior of the policy. The first time
we examine whether there is an edge from i to j, we effectively flip a bias coin with probability pH
(pE) if the agent j is of type H (E). Importantly, we examine at most once whether a directed
edge from i to j exists by the definition of the policy since i either leaves the market or becomes
a bridge agent, in which case it will never match to j. Since both the edge formation and the
matching policies do not depend on agents’ identities (rather only on their types) we can merely
keep track of the number of agents of each type.
In the remainder of the paper, for any policy P, we focus on the state space {[HPt , EPt ]; t ≥ 0},
which captures the number of hard- and easy-to-match agents at any time t, and we denote the
corresponding transition rate matrix by QP .
Given the self-regulating dynamic undergoing each matching process, one would expect that
all three (irreducible) CTMC’s reach steady-state. A rigorous statement and proof is provided in
Appendix F. Hereafter, we are concerned only with steady-state analysis; For policy P, we denote
its steady-state distribution by piP . The random vector [HP , EP ] is the random number of H and
E agents in steady-state, i.e., the vector is distributed according to distribution piP . Finally we
define wPH (w
P
E) to be the average waiting time of type H (E) agents under policy P. Little’s law
implies that
wPH =
E[HP ]
λH
, and wPE =
E[EP ]
λE
. (1)
Since in our model pH → 0 while pE is kept constant, and all policies are myopic, one would
expect that wPE is negligible compared to w
P
H . We verify this claim below using numerical simula-
tions and analytical proofs (see Figure 3 and Lemmas 4 and 5). Therefore we focus on analyzing
the average waiting time of H agents under different policies.
In Section 3, we derive asymptotic results (pH → 0) for wPH for different set of parameters λH ,
λE and pE . We note that w
P
H is indeed a function of four parameters, and a more precise notation
would be wPH(λH , λE , pH , pE), but we drop these parameters for the sake of brevity.
2.1 Motivating application: kidney exchange
Background. There is a large shortage of kidneys for transplants16 and many live donors are
incompatible with their intended recipients. Kidney exchange allows such patient-donor pairs to
swap donors so that each patient can receive a kidney from a compatible donor. There have been
efforts to create large platforms to increase opportunities for kidney exchanges Roth et al. (2004);
Nikzad et al. (2017).
Exchanges are conducted through cycles or chains.17 Typically pairs do not give a kidney prior
to receiving one. This creates logistical barriers requiring cycles to be limited to 2 or 3 pairs.
Chains, however, can be organized non-simultaneously, thus can be longer Roth et al. (2006); Rees
et al. (2009). For a transplant to take place, the patient needs to be both blood-type and tissue-
type compatible with a donor. The common measure of patient sensitivity is the Panel Reactive
16As for 2017, the average waiting time is between 3-5 years in the U.S.
17See So¨nmez et al. (2017) for a detailed description of kidney exchange.
8
Antibody (PRA), which captures the likelihood the patient is tissue-type incompatible with a donor
chosen at random in the population, based on her antibodies.
Numerous kidney exchange platforms operate in the U.S., varying in size, composition, and
policies. Some are national platforms (with many participating hospitals) like the Alliance for
Paired Donation (APD) and the National Kidney Registry (NKR). Others are regional or even
single center programs like Methodist Hospital in San Antonio (MSA).
Data. Next we provide some figures about the pool composition. Kidney exchange platforms are
selected to have a large fraction of highly sensitized patients Ashlagi et al. (2012). Figure 1(left)
plots the PRA distributions of patients enrolled at the NKR, APD and MSA. Most patients are
either highly sensitized (PRA above 95) or low sensitized (below 5 PRA). Note that blood-type
compatibility is not incorporated in this aggregate PRA distribution. Figure 1(right) provides the
same distributions for patients belonging to blood-type compatible pairs (e.g., O-O patient-donor
pairs), who can match with each other if they are tissue-type compatible. These distributions can
be roughly viewed as bimodal; note that among blood-type compatible pairs there are more highly
sensitized patients than low sensitized ones.
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Figure 1: PRA distributions of patients enrolled at NKR (1/2012-12/2014), APD (1/2007-8/2016),
and MSA (7/2013-2/2017). Left: all patients. Right: patients belonging to blood-type compatible
pairs.
Percentage of high PRA patients also varies across programs outside the U.S. In Australia, 42%
of registered candidates have a PRA greater than 90 (Ferrari et al. (2012)) and in the UK, 46%
of patients have a PRA greater than 85 (Johnson et al. (2008)), while in Canada, only 36% of
pairs have a PRA of 80 or more (Malik and Cole (2014)). In the Netherlands, Glorie et al. (2014)
estimate that 30% of patients have a PRA above 97.
Similar to PRA distribution, the pool compositions also vary with respect to blood-type distri-
butions of patient-donor pairs. Ashlagi et al. (2017) report that O-O pairs make 26% at the MSA
pool but only 20.81% of the APD pool; the percentage of pairs that contain an O donor in the
APD and MSA pools are 34.4% and 50.3%, respectively.
These platforms also differ in size; during the period of the data, MSA and APD had an
enrollment rate of roughly 180 pairs per year, while the NKR had an enrollment rate of about 360
pairs per year. Access to altruistic donors also varies, with roughly 1, 8 and 50 altruistic donors
per year at the MSA, APD and NKR, respectively.
Matching. While more than 80% of the transplants at the NKR and the APD have been conducted
through chains (Anderson et al. (2015); NKR (2017)), some platforms (such as MSA, Belgium,
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Czech Republic) match their pairs mostly through cycles due to short access to altruistic donors.
In countries like France, Poland and Portugal, chains are infeasible since altruistic donations are
not permitted (Biro et al. (2017)).
Exchange platforms in the U.S. adopt typically myopic-like matching policies that periodically
search for matches.1819 The APD, MSA, and NKR search for exchanges on a daily basis and UNOS
searches for exchanges bi-weekly.20 However, some countries, such as Canada, United Kingdom,
the Netherlands and Australia, search for exchanges every 3 or 4 months (Ferrari et al. (2014)).
Matching policies at most platforms assign high weights to highly sensitized patients (easy-to-
match patients match quickly (Ashlagi et al. (2017); NKR (2017))). We note, however, that MSA
and NKR assign high priority to compatible pairs, which are very easy-to-match.21 Platforms
typically have multiple desiderata. However, implicit first order related goals are to reduce waiting
times and facilitate many transplants (NKR (2017)).
Policy. Various challenges arise due to variation across kidney exchange pools with respect to their
compositions and even operational issues: What priorities to assign to different types of patients?
What is the impact of attracting more easy-to-match pairs and even compatible pairs?22 How
important is it to incorporate chains and attract altruistic donors?
There are also several initiatives to merge kidney exchange platforms in order to increase ef-
ficiency and matching opportunities for highly sensitized patients (for example, see Bo¨hmig et al.
(2017) for merging the Austrian and the Czech Republic programs, Siegel-Itzkovich (2017) for Israel
and Cyprus; further, Nikzad et al. (2017) look at augmenting national programs through global
kidney exchange.). It is natural to study what is the impact of merging programs on different types
of patients.
This paper does not intend to model the details in kidney exchange. However, our stylized
model does capture some important features in kidney exchange and will hopefully generate some
useful insights.
3 Main results
We analyze the average waiting time under the myopic policies defined in Section 2. For bilateral
matching polices, we identify a stark threshold in the scaling of waiting time when moving from
the regime where a majority of arrivals are hard-to-match agents to the regime where the majority
of arrivals are easy-to-match. Such a contrast does not exist when agents are matched through
chains. We further study the impact of arrival rates of the two types on the market performance
under the three polices.
18Based on personal communication with numerous platforms.
19Generally speaking, a myopic policy is one that upon matching does not explicitly account for possible future
matches.
20There is some concern that this behavior is inefficient (and arguably a result of competition). However, numerical
simulations by Ashlagi et al. (2017) suggest that in steady-state there is essentially no harm from frequent matching
(though having multiple small platforms does harm efficiency). Moreover, MSA is not facing any competition.
21Such pairs could choose to go through a direct transplant if they are not matched quickly.
22See for example Agarwal et al. (2017) and So¨nmez et al. (2017) for incentive schemes towards thickening the pool
with such pairs.
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3.1 Bilateral matching
This section considers the setting, in which agents match only through bilateral exchanges, i.e.
through 2-way cycles.
Theorem 1. Under the BilateralMatch(H) policy and in steady-state, the average waiting time
wBHH satisfies the following.
- If λH < λE, then limpH→0 pHw
BH
H =
ln
(
λE
λE−λH
)
pEλH
.
- If λH > λE, then limpH→0 p
2
Hw
BH
H =
ln
(
2λH
λH+λE
)
λH
.
Theorem 1 provides not only the scaling laws on wBHH but also the associated constants. The
following corollaries provide comparative statics with respect to λH .
Corollary 1. Consider the BilateralMatch(H) policy and fix λE. The limiting average waiting time
wBHH increases with λH in the interval λH < λE.
Corollary 2. Consider the BilateralMatch(H) policy and fix λE. The limiting average waiting time
wBHH increases with λH in the interval λE < λH < x
∗λE, and decreases in the interval λH > x∗λE,
where x∗ ≈ 2.18 is the unique solution of
(x+ 1) ln(2− 2/(x+ 1)) = 1. (2)
The above theorem and corollaries provide several messages on the impact of thickness on the
performance of bilateral matching. First, the main factor in the asymptotic behavior of wBHH is
which type of agents has a larger arrival rate. Some intuition for the scaling factors is the following.
Agents’ average waiting time is inversely proportional to the probability of a bilateral match to
occur. Under a myopic bilateral policy, no existing pair of agents in the market can match with
each other. For an arriving H agent, the probability of forming a bilateral match with an existing
E agent is pEpH , and with an existing H agent is p
2
H . When λH < λE , almost all H agents are
matched with E agents resulting in an average waiting time that scales with 1/pEpH . When H
agents arrive more frequently than E agents, there are simply not enough E agents to match with
H. So a non-negligible fraction of H agents match with each other and thus the scaling of the
average waiting time increases to 1/p2H .
Second, the arrival rates affect the average waiting times directly and not necessarily monoton-
ically. Increasing the arrival rate of E agents always decreases the average waiting time. But this
is not the case with H agents. When λH < λE , the average waiting time of H agents increases
with λH . So even though the market thickens and all H agents match with E agents, increasing
λH creates more competition among H agents. When λH > λE , there is a non-monotone behavior
of the waiting time when increasing λH . Here too, this increase escalates competition among H
to match with E agents and is the dominant effect as long as λH is not “much” larger than λE .
After a certain threshold, the positive effect from having more H agents (increasing the possibility
of forming bilateral matches between H agents), dominates the negative impact that results from
the competition to match with E agents.
The key insight from the above discussion is that in a heterogeneous market, increasing the
arrival rate does not always result in improving the waiting time due to the adverse effect of
11
competition for certain market compositions. This cannot be captured in a homogeneous model
with only hard-to-match agents (the model studied in Anderson et al. (2017)).
Finally, we comment on the impact of pE on the waiting time. When λH < λE , w
BH
H is
decreasing in pE . On the other hand, when λH > λE , w
BH
H is independent of pE . The intuition is
that in the former, all H agents match with E agents and in the latter the dominant factor in the
average waiting time is due to 2-ways between H agents, which is independent of pE .
The proof of Theorem 1 amounts to analyzing the underlying 2-dimensional continuous-time
spatially non-homogeneous random walk. The description of the random walk is presented in Sub-
section 5.1 (Figure 9), along with a heuristic that helps us guess the right constants, and build
intuition on the behavior of the random walk. The main idea behind the proof is establishing
concentration results for a 2-dimensional CTMC where the steady-state distribution decays ge-
ometrically when moving away from the expectation. These concentration results allow us to
establish matching lower and upper bounds on wBHH (the proof is outlined in Subsection 5.1 with
details deferred to Appendix B). We note that one of the main challenges in our analysis is the
need to jointly bound the distribution in both dimensions, because analyzing marginal probability
distributions would not result in tight bounds. As a byproduct of our analysis, in Subsection 5.2,
we state two auxiliary lemmas on concentration bounds for a general class of 2-dimensional random
walks. The corollaries follow from basic analysis of the corresponding constants (as a function of
λH). Both corollaries are proved in Appendix B.2.
Theorem 2. Under the BilateralMatch(E) policy and in steady-state, the average waiting time
wBEH satisfies the following.
- If λH < λE, then
ln
(
λE
λE−λH
)
pEλH
≤ limpH→0 pHwBEH ≤
ln
(
2λE
λE−λH
)
pEλH
.
- If λH > λE, then limpH→0 p
2
Hw
BE
H =
ln
(
2λH
λH+λE
)
λH
.
Comparing results of Theorems 1 and 2, we observe that when λH < λE , the average waiting
time of H agents is larger or equal when prioritizing E agents rather then H agents (numerical
simulations presented in Subsection 4.2 suggest that prioritizing E agents results in a strictly
larger average waiting time). Nevertheless, the scaling remains the same. However, when λH > λE
prioritizing E agents does not impact the waiting time of H agents. The intuition is as follows.
When λH > λE , the number of H agents waiting in the market scales as 1/p
2
H , suggesting that the
chance that an E agent does not match immediately upon arrival vanishes. Therefore assigning
priority to E agents is redundant.
The proof of Theorem 2 also requires analysis of the underlying 2-dimensional continuous-time
spatially non-homogeneous random walk, and, in most parts, follows a similar structure to the proof
of Theorem 1. A detailed description of the random walk is presented in Subsection 5.3. The proof
of the upper and lower bounds is presented in Appendix C, where establishing the upper bound
requires new ideas beyond the concentration results: we couple the Markov process underlying
policy BE with another process in which an E agent that cannot form a match upon arrival turns
into an H agent.23 In Subsection 5.3, we also provide a heuristic argument that leads us to guess
that the exact limit is
ln
(
λE+λH
λE−λH
)
pEpH
(See Figure 7 in Subsection 4.5).
23In Subsection 5.3 we provide a rough intuition on why we cannot close the gap between our upper and lower
bounds on wBEH for the regime λH < λE .
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3.2 Chain matching
In this section we analyze the ChainMatch(d) policy, under which agents match myopically through
chains.
3.2.1 Waiting time behavior
Theorem 3. Let d ≥ 1 be a constant (independent of pH). Under the ChainMatch(d) policy and
in steady-state, the average waiting time w
C(d)
H satisfies
lim
pH→0
pHw
C(d)
H ≤
ln
(
λH
λE(1−(1−pE)d) + 1
)
λH
.
A stronger result is obtained for the special case, in which pE = 1:
Proposition 1. Let pE = 1 and d ≥ 1 be a constant (independent of pH). Then
lim
pH→0
pHw
C(d)
H =
ln
(
λH
λE
+ 1
)
λH
.
Consequently, limpH→0 pHw
C(d)
H decreases with λE and λH .
First we discuss the intuition behind Proposition 1, which states that when pE = 1, any constant
number of altruistic agents will result in the same behavior of w
C(d)
H . The positive impact of having
d > 1 altruistic agents stems from the increase in probability of starting a new chain-segment.
When an H agent arrives, the probability that she finds one of the bridge agents acceptable is
1− (1− pH)d which vanishes as pH → 0. When an E agent arrives she will always be matched by
one of the bridge agents and proceed to advance the chain-segment, and thus there is no advantage
in having more than one bridge agent.
While we are not able to pin down the exact behavior when pE < 1, some intuition suggests
that the behaviour for pE < 1 is similar to the case in which pE = 1: even though having less
bridge agents decreases the likelihood of starting a new chain-segment upon arrival of an E agent,
this by itself does not result in longer waiting times for H agents. Suppose an arriving E agent
i cannot be matched by one of the bridge agents, and therefore joins the market. We argue that
the presence of i in the market helps matching more H agents in the (near) future chain-segments.
Consider the first time a chain-segment is being formed after i joins the market. Because H agents
have priority, the chain-segment tries to advance through H agents until it gets “stuck” (i.e, cannot
find an H agent to add). At this point, with a constant probability agent i can match the last
agent in the chain-segment and therefore can progress the chain-segment through more H agents.
In Subsection 4.3, we study numerically the impact of arrival rates and number of altruistic agents
on the waiting time for the case pE < 1. Our numerical results are qualitatively in agreement with
the predictions of Proposition 1.
When pE < 1, in a heuristic argument (in Appendix E), we analyze a related 3-dimensional
random walk by artificially assuming that chain-segments advance according to an independent
Poisson process with a very high rate µ (recall that under C(d) policy, chain-segments are formed
and executed instantaneously upon arrivals). The heuristic provides an estimated waiting time that
scales as ln
(
λH+λE
λH(1−(1−pH)d)+λE
)
/pH . In the limit when pH approaches zero, the constant converges
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to ln
(
λH+λE
λE
)
which is consistent with Proposition 1. Numerical simulations that are aligned with
the result of the heuristic argument are presented in Subsection 4.5 (see Figure 8)
Finally we comment on the chain-segment formation process; ChainMatch(d) policy forms chain-
segments employing a local search process and indeed our analysis relies on such chain-segment
formation process. This begs the question of how much the waiting time improves if we employed a
global search (that searches for the longest possible chain-segment). A precise comparison is beyond
the scope of our work, however, we make the following remarks: (1) In Figure 5 of Subsection 4.3,
we numerically study this questions, and we see that advancing chains locally results in a small
loss in comparison to policies that search globally for the longest possible chain-segment. (2) The
lower-bound on the waiting time of any anonymous Markovian policy (See Anderson et al. (2017)
and Proposition 9 in Appendix G) implies that the scaling of H-agent waiting time cannot be
smaller than 1/pH (unless the policy makes E agents wait for a very long time, i.e., proportional
to 1/pH); Theorem 3 shows that the local-search method already achieves such a scaling.
Under the ChainMatch(d) policy, the length of a chain-segment trigged by a newly arrived agent
is unrestricted. As a result the underlying CTMC is significantly more complicated to analyze than
those that arise from bilateral policies and we need other techniques to prove Theorem 3. In order
to bound w
C(d)
H , we couple the underlying Markov chain with a 1-dimensional chain, in which E
agents that are not matched upon arrival leave the market immediately (Lemma 3). A key property
used in the analysis of the coupled 1-dimensional chain is that chain-segment formation exhibits a
memoryless property.24 This is due to the local search process used to advance a chain-segment,
which randomly selects the next agent among all possible agents (favoring H agents). The proof
is presented in 5.4. Finally, we note that for the special case pE = 1, the original CTMC is a
1-dimensional chain for which we can prove matching upper and lower bounds on the limit of w
C(d)
H .
Theorems 1 and 3 together highlight the importance of having altruistic agents that can initiate
chains. In the regime λH > λE comparing w
BH
H and w
C(d)
H is straightforward as the former scales
as 1/p2H but the latter only scales as 1/pH . The following corollary (proven in appendix D) states
that in the regime λH < λE where both w
BH
H and w
C(d)
H scale as 1/pH , ChainMatch(d) performs
better:
Corollary 3. For any λH , λE, pE, and d, if λH < λE then limpH→0 pHw
C(d)
H < limpH→0 pHw
BH
H .
In Subsection 4.4 we further compare BilateralMatch(H) to ChainMatch(d) in order to under-
stand the importance of attracting easy-to-match agents in markets that have limited access to
altruistic agents.
3.2.2 Chain-segment length
We analyze here the expected length of chain-segments formed under the ChainMatch(d) policy.
While we focus on the average waiting time to measure efficiency, length of chain-segments also
play a significant role on the operational efficiency of the market. In kidney exchange for example,
executing a chain-segment takes time and bears the risk of match failures.25 These practical
considerations motivate extending the analysis to the limiting behavior of chain-segments.
24This is different from the Markov property of the overall CTMC under C(d).
25In this stylized model, we abstract away from both of these effects.
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First we define the chain-segment length. Let [H
C(d)
k , E
C(d)
k ] denote the (discrete-time) Markov
chain embedded in the CTMC [H
C(d)
t , E
C(d)
t ] resulting from observing the system at arrival epochs.
26
Define:
Lk = Hk + Ek −Hk+1 − Ek+1 + 1,
and let L be its corresponding random variable in steady-state; if the arriving agent cannot be
matched by the bridge agent, she will join the market, and therefore Lk = 0; otherwise, a chain-
segment of length Lk ≥ 1 will be formed. The following proposition characterizes the chain-segment
length in the limit:
Proposition 2. Under the ChainMatch(d) policy and in steady-state,
lim
pH→0
E[L | L ≥ 1] = λH + λE(1− pE)
d
λE(1− (1− pE)d) + 1.
The proof is presented in Appendix D. We note that the expected chain length is decreasing in
both λE and d, but increasing in λH ; intuitively with more E agents or more bridge agents, chain-
segments will be formed at a higher rate and thus be shorter (for a fixed λH). However, increasing
λH does not significantly impact the frequency of chain-segment formation, but given that more
H agents join the market within two consecutive chain-segments, the length of the chain-segment
grows.
4 Numerical studies
In this section, we present a set of numerical simulations that complement the theoretical results of
the previous section. In Subsection 4.1 we look at how merging markets with different compositions
affect each market. Subsection 4.2 explores the impact of giving priorities when using the bilateral
matching policy. Subsection 4.3 presents comparative statics for chain matching when pE < 1,
and subsection 4.4 highlights the advantage of having chains. Finally, Subsection 4.5 compares
our theoretical bounds (for cases for which we do not have matching upper and lower bounds) to
heuristics guesses and simulations.
All simulations in this section are conducted by first computing the average number of agents in
the market; then applying Little’s law (1). In order to compute the number of agents, we simulate
the discrete-time Markov chain embedded in the corresponding CTMC resulting from observing the
system at arrival epochs. We denote T the number of arrivals (not counting the d initial altruistic
agents in the case of C(d)). In order to remove the transient behavior, the numbers reported
correspond to the time average over the second half of the simulation.
4.1 Merging markets
We consider here the effects from merging two markets, with arrival rates (λH,1, λE,1) and
(λH,2, λE,2) under bilateral exchanges using the BilateralMatch(H) policy. This expands Theorem
1, which provides comparative statics in the limit when pH tends to zero.
We consider two numerical examples to illustrate these effects. In both examples the arrival
rates to the first market are kept fixed while the arrivals rates to the second market vary. For any
26Note that every time an agent arrives, the Markov chain advances in discrete time from k to k + 1.
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pair of arrivals we compare the waiting time wH,1 of H agents in the first market with the average
waiting time wH,1−2 in the merged market. The results are plotted in Figure 2. Consistent with
our prediction, merging can result in one of the markets being worse off. Note that this can happen
even if the majority type is the same for both markets (e.g., when λH,1 > λE,1 and λH,2 > λE,2).
This highlights the effect of arrival rates beyond their impact on the scaling factor. 27
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Figure 2: Change in the waiting time for H agents of the first market: wH,1−2−wH,1, as a function
of (λH,2, λE,2), for pE = 0.5, pH = 0.02, after T = 10
5 iterations. Left subplot corresponds to
λH,1 = 1, λE,1 = 1.3, right subplot corresponds to λH,1 = 1.3, λE,1 = 1. The purple line separates
the region where the waiting time increases after merging (below the line) and the region where it
decreases (above the line).
4.2 Impact of priorities in bilateral matching
We compare here the average waiting time of H agents under the BilateralMatch(H) and Bilat-
eralMatch(E) policies. From Theorems 1 and 2 it follows that (i) when λH > λE , asymptotically,
the average waiting time of H agents is the same under both policies, but (ii) when λH < λE , the
average waiting time of H agents under BH is at most the average waiting time under BE . However,
numerical simulations suggest that the average waiting time of H agents is indeed strictly smaller
under BH than under BE (Figure 3 left). For instance, in simulation setting of Figure 3, when
λH = 4 and λE = 5 , we have w
BE
H = 534 while w
BH
H = 388. The average waiting times of E
agents are plotted in Figure 3(right).
The main insight is that the benefit from assigning priority to hard-to-match agents varies based
on the composition of the market. Further, our qualitative insights can be useful in understanding
the tradeoffs that may arise in markets where easy-to-match agents have outside options. For
example, when λH > λE , there is no tradeoff from prioritizing E agents. This issue arises in kidney
exchange, where very easy-to-match patient-donor pairs (such as compatible pairs) may choose to
get transplanted elsewhere.
27We note that the constants computed in Theorem 1 allow us to determine whether market one is better off or
worse off for any (λH,2, λE,2), and to compute the boundary separating the two regions, in the limit pH → 0.
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Figure 3: Comparison of wH (left) and wE (right) for BH , BE , as a function of λH , for a fixed
λE = 5, T = 2 · 106, pE = 0.5 and pH = 0.002.
4.3 Comparative statics in chain matching with pE < 1
We run simulations using ChainMatch(d) to numerically explore the effects varying d, λE , and λH
have on w
C(d)
H .
We find that w
C(d)
H decreases as the arrival rate of either types increases (Figure 4 left and
middle). Moreover, the value of an additional altruistic agent also diminishes with increasing λE ,
λH or d.
Further, as pH decreases, the impact of d vanishes (Figure 4 right). Observe that the simulation
results (in which pE < 1) are qualitatively aligned with the predictions of Proposition 1 even for
the case pE < 1.
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Figure 4: Left: w
C(d)
H for varying values of d as a function of λE , for fixed λH = 2, T = 10
5,
pE = 0.5, pH = 0.02. Middle: w
C(d)
H for varying values of d as a function of λH , for fixed λE = 2,
T = 105, pE = 0.5, pH = 0.02. Right: Normalized waiting times (i.e., pHw
C(d)
H ) in the case of chains
for varying values of d as a function of pH , for fixed λH = 2, λE = 1, T = 10
5, pE = 0.5.
Next we study the loss from employing a local search for forming chain-segments rather than
looking for the maximum-length path at each chain-segment-formation. For this, we define a
new policy Max-Chains that upon starting a chain-segment searches for the chain-segment that
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maximizes lexicographically the number of H agents matched, while breaking ties over matching
more agents over all.
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Figure 5: Waiting times wH for chains conducted with local-search (C(d)) and Max-Chains as a
function of λH , for fixed λE = 2, T = 10
5, pE = 0.5, pH = 0.002.
We observe that the benefit of using Max-Chains is small when λH is small compared to λE ,
and it increases as λH increases. If we consider λE/2 ≤ λH ≤ 2λE as the practical range relevant
to the kidney exchange programs, our simulations suggest that the loss ranges between 5 to 15%.
4.4 Impact of the matching technology: bilateral vs. chain matching
Theorems 1 and 3 imply that for any arrival rates (λH , λE) matching through chains even with
only one initial altruistic agent (i.e., under ChainMatch(1)) results in shorter average waiting time
for H agents. The theoretical gap is significant when λH > λE . We run numerical simulations for
a variety of parameters to examine these differences (see Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Comparison of wH , for BH , C(1), and C(20), as a function of λH , for a fixed λE = 5,
T = 2 ∗ 106, pE = 0.5 and pH = 0.02.
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Table 1: λE,2 as a function of pE and d, for pH = 0.02, λH = 1 and λE,1 = 2, T = 10
6.
pE 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.9 1.0
d = 1 20.75 8.45 5.4 3.3 3.0
d = 10 27.15 10.25 6.55 3.9 3.6
d = 50 66.05 24.8 15.1 9.0 8.15
To further highlight the benefit of matching through chains, we consider the following scenario:
Suppose market 1 has rates (λH,1, λE,1) with λH,1 < λE,1 and is endowed with d altruistic agents
and employs policy ChainMatch(d). Now consider a second market with arrival rates (λH,2, λE,2)
that does not have any altruistic agents and therefore employs BilateralMatch(H). Further suppose
λH,1 = λH,2 = λH ; how many more E agents does market 2 need to attract to be able to compete
with market 1 in term of average waiting times of H agents? In the limit pH → 0, by Theorems 1
and 3, for this to happens it is necessary that:
ln
(
λH
λE,1(1−(1−pE)d) + 1
)
λH
≥
ln
(
λE,2
λE,2−λH
)
λHpE
,
which is equivalent to:
λE,2 ≥ λH(λH + λE,1(1− (1− pE)
d))pE
(λH + λE,1(1− (1− pE)d))pE − (λE,1(1− (1− pE)d))pE .
Note that the above condition is only a necessary condition, and valid in the limit pH → 0. In
the case where pE = 1, Proposition 1 makes this also a sufficient condition, and it simplifies to
λE,2 ≥ λH + λE,1. In table 1, we report the numerical values for λE,2 such that in simulations
wBHH,2 = w
C(d)
H,1 .
4.5 Theoretical bounds vs heuristics vs. simulation
In two cases, our theoretical results yield bounds which are are not tight. However, in each of these
cases we generate a heuristic guess for the exact behaviour. We plot here the simulation results, our
heuristically generated guess (described later in Section 5.3 and Appendix E) and the theoretical
bounds for a variety of parameters. The first case is under the policy BilateralMatch(E) when
λH < λE . Figure 7 shows that our heuristic analysis (described in Section 5.3) results in a guess
of
ln
(
λE+λH
λE−λH
)
pEpH
that coincides with the simulation results. The figure further illustrates the behavior
of our theoretical bounds for different parameters.
The second case is under the policy ChainMatch(d) when pE < 1. Here too, Figure 8 shows
that that our heuristic guess ln
(
λH+λE
λH(1−(1−pH)d)+λE
)
/pH (described in Appendix E) coincides with
the numerical simulations.
5 Proof ideas and outline of analysis
The analysis of each policy follows a similar pattern, although technically analyzing the bilateral
setting and the chain setting are very different. For bilateral policies, we first offer a heuristic
19
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Figure 7: Left: wBEH as a function of λH , for λE = 5, T = 10
5, pE = 0.5, pH = 0.002. Right: w
BE
H
as a function of λE , for λH = 1, T = 10
5, pE = 0.5, pH = 0.002.
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Figure 8: Left: w
C(1)
H as a function of λH , for λE = 3, T = 10
5, pE = 0.5, pH = 0.002. Right: w
C(1)
H
as a function of λE , for λH = 3, T = 10
5, pE = 0.5, pH = 0.002.
that will help guessing the value of E[HP ] (which is proportional to the average waiting time) and
then proceed to rigourously analyze E[HP ]. For the chain policy, we first couple the underlying
Markov chain with a 1-dimensional chain whose number of H agents serve as an upper-bound on
the number of H agents under ChainMatch(d) policy. We then proceed to analyze the expected
number of H agents in the coupled chain. In all three settings, the main idea is to prove that HP
is concentrated around E[HP ] without directly computing the steady-state distribution, and based
on the exponential decay of the tail distribution when moving away from the expected value.
We often use the following notations to avoid terms that vanish in the limit pH → 0. Let
f, g : [0, 1] → R; We write that f = o(g) if limpH→0 f(pH)g(pH) = 0 and write that f = O(g) if
lim suppH→0
f(pH)
g(pH)
<∞.
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5.1 The BilateralMatch(H) policy
In this section we analyze the policy BH , which forms myopically bilateral exchanges while priori-
tizing H agents. Under this policy, the evolution of the number of H and E agents in the market
can be modeled by a CTMC [Ht, Et] ∈ N2 with the following transition rates.
QBH ([h, e], [h+ 1, e]) = λH(1− p2H)h(1− pEpH)e (3a)
QBH ([h, e], [h− 1, e]) = λH(1− (1− p2H)h) + λE(1− (1− pEpH)h) (3b)
QBH ([h, e], [h, e+ 1]) = λE(1− pEpH)h(1− p2E)e (3c)
QBH ([h, e], [h, e− 1]) = λH(1− p2H)h(1− (1− pEpH)e) + λE(1− pEpH)h(1− (1− p2E)e)) (3d)
The rates are computed based on the Poisson thinning property, simple counting arguments,
and our assumption that edges are formed independently.
- Rightward rate (3a): moving from [h, e] to [h + 1, e] happens when an H agent arrives and
cannot form a cycle with any of the existing H agents (with probability (1− p2H)h) nor with
any of the existing E agents (with probability (1− pEpH)e).
- Leftward rate (3b): moving from [h, e] to [h − 1, e] happens when an H agent arrives and
forms a cycle with at least one of the existing H agents (probability (1 − (1 − p2H)h)) or an
E agent arrives and forms a cycle with at least one of the existing H agents (probability
(1− (1− pEpH)h)).
- Upward rate (3c): moving from [h, e] to [h, e+1] happens when an E agent arrives and cannot
form a cycle with any of the existing H agents (probability (1− pEpH)h) nor with with any
of the existing E agents (probability (1− p2E)e).
- Downward rate (3d): moving from [h, e] to [h, e − 1] happens when an H agent arrives and
cannot form a cycle with any of the existing H agent (probability (1− p2H)h) but can form a
cycle with an existing E agents (probability (1 − (1 − pEpH)e)), or an E agent arrives that
cannot form a cycle with any of the existing H agents (probability (1−pEpH)h) but can form
a cycle with an existing E agent (probability (1− (1− p2E)e)).
Note that the process is a 2-dimensional continuous-time spatially non-homogeneous random
walk. Figure 9 illustrates this random walk along with its transition rates. Also observe that the
leftward and downward rates (3b) and (3d) depend on the priority assigned to H agents, and these
rates will change when prioritizing E agents, as we will see in the Subsection 5.3. However, fixing
the priority, changing the tie-breaking rule between agents of the same type (for example, favoring
agents with longer waiting times instead of selecting one at random) does not change the transition
rates.
In Appendix F, we prove that the above (irreducible) CTMC is positive recurrent, and therefore
reaches steady-state. This is intuitive given the above transition rates and the “self-regulating”
behavior of the process. The larger the market, the larger the probability that an arriving agent
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[h, e] [h+1, e][h-1, e]
[h, e+1]
[h, e-1] ......
......
λH(1− p2H)h(1− pEpH)e
λH(1− (1− p2H)h)
+λE(1− (1− pEpH)h)
λE(1− pEpH)h(1− p2E)e
λH(1− p2H)h(1− (1− pEpH)e)
+λE(1− pEpH)h(1− (1− p2E)e)
Figure 9: Transition rates (solid arrows) under the CTMC induced by the BH policy.
can form a cycle. Note that in steady-state, the expected drift for this CTMC in both horizontal
and vertical dimension is zero. The drifts are given in (3a)-(3d), and therefore,
E
[
λH(1− p2H)H
BH (1− pEpH)EBH − λH(1− (1− p2H)H
BH )− λE(1− (1− pEpH)HBH )
]
= 0 (4a)
E[λE(1− pEpH)HBH (1− p2E)E
BH − λH(1− p2H)H
BH (1− (1− pEpH)EBH )
− λE(1− pEpH)HBH (1− (1− p2E)E
BH )] = 0 (4b)
Assuming that the random variables HBH and EBH are very concentrated around their expec-
tations, a reasonable approximation is to move the expectation inside the functions and solve the
above system of nonlinear equations, and thus obtain approximations for E[HBH ] and E[EBH ].
- For λH < λE , if we plug [H
BH , EBH ] =
[
ln
(
λE
λE−λH
)
pEpH
, − ln(2)
ln(1−p2E)
]
into (4a)-(4b), the right-hand
sides will be O(pH) terms.
- For λH > λE , if we plug [H
BH , EBH ] =
[
ln
(
2λH
λH+λE
)
p2H
, 0
]
into (4a)-(4b), the right-hand sides
will be O(p2H) terms.
This heuristic exercise provides us the correct value of E[HBH ] in both cases. To establish this
value rigorously and prove Theorem 1 we show, in the following two propositions, that HBH is
highly concentrated around its mean.
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Proposition 3. [Lower-bound] Under BH and in steady-state,
- If λH < λE, there exists a constant c1 such that:
P
[
HBH ≤ 1
pEpH
(
ln
(
λE
λE − λH
)
− c1p1/4H
)]
≤ o(pH).
- If λH > λE, there exists a constant c2 such that:
P
[
HBH ≤ 1
p2H
(
ln
(
2λH
λE + λH
)
− c2√pH
)]
≤ o(pH).28
Proposition 4. [Upper-bound] Under BH and in steady-state, for any k ≥ 0,
- If λH < λE, there exists a function γ(pH) = 1−√pH + o(√pH) and a constant c3 such that:
P
[
HBH ≥ 1
pEpH
(
ln
(
λE
λE − λH
)
+ c3
√
pH
)
+ k
]
≤ γ(pH)
k
1− γ(pH) .
- If λH > λE, there exists a function γ
′(pH) = 1−√pH + o(√pH) and a constant c4 such that:
P
[
HBH ≥ 1
p2H
(
ln
(
2λH
λE + λH
)
+ c4
√
pH
)
+ k
]
≤ γ
′(pH)k
1− γ′(pH) .
Note that in both cases in Proposition 4, if k = p
−3/4
H then the right-hand sides become o(p
2
H).
The proof of Theorem 1 is a straightforward application of these propositions and the details are
presented in Appendix B.1. To prove these propositions we derive exponentially decaying bounds
on tails of the steady-state distribution of HBH and EBH . In the next subsection we present two
auxiliary lemmas that establish such bounds for a general class of 2-dimensional continuous-time
random walks that includes the random walk defined above. The proof of Propositions 3 and 4
amount to applying these lemmas with appropriately defined parameters. The proofs are presented
in Appendix B.4 and B.3, respectively.
5.2 Concentration bounds for a general class of 2-dimensional random walks
In the analysis of both BilateralMatch(H) and BilateralMatch(E) policies, we repeatedly bound
the left-tail or the right-tail of the steady-state distribution of the number of H agents in the
market. These bounds rely on certain properties of the corresponding 2-dimensional continuous-
time random walks, which allow us to establish exponential decay on each tail of the steady-state
distribution. To avoid repeating these concentration results for each particular setting, we take a
unifying approach and state the following two auxiliary lemmas that establish concentration results
for a general class of 2-dimensional random walks under certain conditions. These lemmas maybe
useful in other applications that give rise to similar random walks.
28While we do have closed form formulas for c1, c2 (similarly for c3, c4 defined in the next proposition), these values
are not informative. We refer the reader to the proofs for more details.
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Lemma 1. [Lower-bound] Let [Xt, Yt] ∈ N2 be a positive recurrent continuous time random walk
with transition rate matrix Q and [X,Y ] be a corresponding random vector following its steady-state
distribution. Suppose the following exist:
Condition 1. A set S ⊂ N and a constant  > 0 such that P[Y 6∈ S] ≤ .
Condition 2. A non-increasing function f : N 7→ (0,∞) such that ∀y ∈ S, Q([x, y], [x+1, y]) ≥ f(x).
Condition 3. A non-decreasing function g : N 7→ (0,∞) such that ∀y ∈ S, Q([x, y], [x−1, y]) ≤ g(x).
Then for all ρ < 1 and η ∈ N such that g(η+1)f(η) < ρ, and any k > 0 we have:
P[X ≤ η − k] ≤ η
(
1 +
1
f(η)− g(η + 1)
)
+
ρk
1− ρ.
Proof of Lemma 1. Let pi(x, y) be the joint distribution of [X,Y ], and let piX(x) =
∑
y≥0 pi(x, y) be
the marginal distribution of X. In steady-state, conservation of flow implies:
∑
y∈S
pi(x+ 1, y)Q([x+ 1, y], [x, y]) +
∑
y 6∈S
pi(x+ 1, y)Q([x+ 1, y], [x, y])
=
∑
y∈S
pi(x, y)Q([x, y], [x+ 1, y]) +
∑
y 6∈S
pi(x, y)Q([x, y], [x+ 1, y]).
Using Conditions 2 and 3, we upper-bound the left hand side and lower-bound the right hand side
which results in having:
g(x+ 1)P[X = x+ 1, Y ∈ S] + P[X = x+ 1, Y 6∈ S] ≥ f(x)P[X = x, Y ∈ S].
Let piS(x) = P[X = x, Y ∈ S] =
∑
y∈S pi(x, y). Observe that by Condition 1 we have: piX(x) ≤
piS(x) + . Using the fact that g is non-decreasing and f is non-increasing, we get for x ≤ η:
piS(x) ≤ g(x+ 1)
f(x)
piS(x+ 1) +
P[Y 6∈ S]
f(x)
≤ ρpiS(x+ 1) + 
f(η)
.
We can subtract /f(η)1−ρ from both sides and iterate: for all j ≥ 0,
piS(η − j)− /f(η)
1− ρ ≤ ρ
j
(
piS(η)− /f(η)
1− ρ
)
≤ ρj .
This allows us to conclude that for any k > 0:
P[X ≤ η − k] =
η−k∑
i=0
piX(i) ≤ (η − k)+
η∑
j=k
piS(η − j)
≤ (η − k)
(
1 +
1/f(η)
1− ρ
)
+
η∑
j=k
ρj ≤ η
(
1 +
1
f(η)(1− ρ)
)
+
ρk
1− ρ.
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Lemma 2. [Upper-bound] Let [Xt, Yt] ∈ N2 be a positive recurrent continuous time random walk
with transition rate matrix Q and let [X,Y ] be a corresponding random vector following its steady-
state distribution. Suppose the following exist:
Condition 1. A mapping S : N 7→ 2N and two constants c ∈ R+, δ ∈ (0, 1) such that
P[Y 6∈ S(x)] ≤ cδx.
Condition 2. Two functions f, g : N 7→ (0,∞) such that ∀y ∈ S, Q([x, y], [x + 1, y]) ≤ f(x) and
Q([x, y], [x− 1, y]) ≥ g(x).
Then for all η > 0 and ρ ∈ [δ, 1) such that ∀x ≥ η, f(x)g(x+1) ≤ ρ, and δ
x
g(x+1) ≤ ρ
x
g(η+1) , and for any
k > 0 we have: 29
P[X ≥ η + k] ≤ ρ
k
1− ρ
(
1 + c+
c(k + 1)
g(η + 1)− f(η)
)
.
The proof of Lemma 2 follows similar arguments to that of Lemma 1 and is deferred to Appendix
A.
5.3 The BilateralMatch(E) policy
The policy BE forms myopically bilateral exchanges while prioritizing E agents. The transition
rate of the underlying CTMC are as follows.
QBE ([h, e], [h+ 1, e]) = λH(1− p2H)h(1− pEpH)e (5a)
QBE ([h, e], [h− 1, e]) = λH(1− pEpH)e(1− (1− p2H)h) + λE(1− p2E)e(1− (1− pEpH)h) (5b)
QBE ([h, e], [h, e+ 1]) = λE(1− pEpH)h(1− p2E)e (5c)
QBE ([h, e], [h, e− 1]) = λH(1− (1− pEpH)e) + λE(1− (1− p2E)e) (5d)
The rates are computed similarly to those under the BilateralMatch(H). Observe that prior-
itizing E results in different leftward and downward rates (5b) and (5d) than the corresponding
rates under BilateralMatch(H). In particular note that in the leftward rate (moving from [h, e] to
[h− 1, e]), the probability that an arriving E agent matches an existing H agent depends now on
the current number of E agents. This dependency does not exist in BilateralMatch(H). This makes
the analysis of BilateralMatch(E) more difficult since we need to compute tight bounds also on the
number of E agents in the market. While we are able to prove such bounds in the case λH > λE ,
we are not able to do so in the case λH < λE .
As before, we set the expected drifts at steady-state in both dimensions to zero, resulting in
the following system of equations.
E[λH(1− p2H)H
BE (1− pEpH)EBE − λH(1− pEpH)EBE (1− (1− p2H)H
BE )
− λE(1− p2E)E
BE (1− (1− pEpH)HBE )] = 0 (6a)
E
[
λE(1− pEpH)HBE (1− p2E)E
BE − λH(1− (1− pEpH)EBE )− λE(1− (1− p2E)E
BE )
]
= 0. (6b)
29Note that the above conditions are weaker than that of Lemma 1 (where f is non-increasing, g is non-decreasing
and f(η)
g(η+1)
≤ ρ). We will need this for the proofs of Propositions 3 and 7 where the corresponding function g is not
monotone.
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Similar to the heuristic analysis for BilateralMatch(H), we can obtain the following approxima-
tions for E[HBE ] and E[EBE ].
- For the case λH < λE , if we plug
[
ln
(
λE+λH
λE−λH
)
pEpH
,
ln
(
λE+λH
2λE
)
ln(1−p2E)
]
into (6a)-(6b), the right-hand sides
will be O(pH) terms.
- For the case, λH > λE , if we plug
[
ln
(
2λH
λH+λE
)
p2H
, 0
]
into (6a)-(6b), the right-hand sides will be
O(p2H) terms.
As stated in Theorem 2, for the case λH > λE the constant for the limit of
E[HBE ]
λH
coincides
with the solution given by the above heuristic. For the case, λH < λE , the constant resulting from
the above heuristic argument lies in between the constants of the lower and upper bounds we can
prove (in Theorem 2), i.e.,
ln
(
λE
λE−λH
)
pE
≤
ln
(
λE+λH
λE−λH
)
pE
≤
ln
(
2λE
λE−λH
)
pE
.
In Figure 7 (Section 4.5), we numerically show that
ln
(
λE+λH
λE−λH
)
pE
is indeed the right constant.
The proof of the case λH > λE , and the lower bound when λH < λE in Theorem 2 follows
similar steps as that of Theorem 1, and it uses the concentration results of the lemmas stated in
the previous subsection. The difficulty in closing the gap between our lower and upper bounds for
the case λH < λE comes from the dependency of the leftward rate on the current number of E
agents (i.e., the second term in (5b)). Our bounds on the right-tail of the distribution of number
of E agent are not tight enough to result in a matching lower and upper bounds. Closing this gap
remains an open question. A notable difference is that in (3a) and (3b), knowing that E is bounded
above by a constant (independent of pH) is enough to get matching upper and lower bounds (up
to a vanishing term). This, however, is not the case in (5b). To prove the upper bound in the case
λH < λE we couple the Markov process underlying policy BE with another process in which an E
agent that cannot form a match upon arrival turns into an H agent. See subsection C.2.
5.4 The ChainMatch(d) policy
This section proves Theorem 3 and Proposition 1. As we could establish only an upper bound for
the average waiting time when pE < 1, we refer the reader to Appendix E for a heuristic analysis
that leads us to guess the constant that we can numerically verify to be the correct one (See Figure
8 of Subsection 4.5).
Instead of directly analyzing the ChainMatch(d) policy under our setting, we consider a modified
setting, in which an E agent that does not match immediately upon arrival is removed from the
system. We refer to this new setting under the policy ChainMatch(d) by Cˆ(d). Observe that H Cˆ(d)t
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is a 1-dimensional CTMC with the following transition rates:
QCˆ(d)(h, h+ 1) = λH(1− pH)d, (7a)
QCˆ(d)(h, h− i) =
(
λH(1− (1− pH)d) + λE(1− (1− pE)d)
)
(1− pH)h−i
i−1∏
j=0
(1− (1− pH)h−j),
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , h}. (7b)
The first expression, (7a), corresponds to rate, at which an H agent arrives, but cannot be matched
by a bridge agent. The second expression, (7b), corresponds to the rate, at which an agent arrives,
is matched by a bridge agent and forms a chain-segment of length i.30 In Appendix F, we show
that the above CTMC reaches steady-state.
We introduce some notation to simplify (7b). Set Λ = λH(1− (1− pH)d) + λE(1− (1− pE)d),
which is the rate at which a new chain-segment (possibly of length 1) starts, regardless of the
current state, and let Sh be the random number of agents removed from the system, starting from
state h.31 For any i ≤ h we can write
QCˆ(d)(h, h− i) = ΛP[Sh = i] = Λ(1− pH)h−i
i−1∏
j=0
(1− (1− pH)h−j). (8)
Observe that we have
P[Sh ≥ k] =
k−1∏
j=0
(1− (1− pH)h−j) (9)
The proof proceeds by showing that E[H Cˆ(d)] serves as an upper bound for E[HC(d)] (Lemma
3) and then computing the limit of E[H Cˆ(d)] (Proposition 5). Before that, we make the following
crucial observation: the process of chain-segment formation under Cˆ(d) exhibits a memoryless
property. That is, for any state h and any i˜ ≤ i ≤ h:
P[Sh = i] = (1− pH)h−i
i−1∏
j=0
(1− (1− pH)h−j) (10)
=
i˜−1∏
j=0
(
1− (1− pH)h−j
)(1− pH)(h−i˜)−(i−i˜) (i−i˜)−1∏
j=0
(
1− (1− pH)(h−i˜)−j
)
= P[Sh ≥ i˜]P[Sh−i˜ = i− i˜],
30Observe that the case i = 0 is possible, and corresponds to an arriving agent that can receive from a bridge agent
but cannot continue the chain further. In that case the CTMC does not transition and we consider the chain-segment
to have length 1.
31Note that using the notation from Section 3.2.2, Sh + 1 corresponds to the length of the chain-segment Lk for
the 1-dimensional Markov chain.
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In other words, the event of forming a chain-segment of length i can be decomposed into two
independent events: forming a chain-segment of length at least i˜ and then forming a chain-segment
of length i− i˜ starting with h− i˜ agents in the market. This heavily relies on the fact that chain-
segments proceed in a local search (one by one) fashion and the independence assumption. Indeed,
the chain-segment formation in the original 2-dimensional chain C(d) has a similar property.
We now show that E[H Cˆ(d)] is an upper bound for E[HC(d)].
Lemma 3. The expected number of H agents in steady-state under Cˆ(d) satisfies:
E[HC(d)] ≤ E[H Cˆ(d)].
Proof. The proof is based on a coupling argument. Consider two copies of the arrival process, one
under the setting of C(d) and one under Cˆ(d). Let [HC(d)k , EC(d)k ] and H Cˆ(d)k denote the embedded
discrete-time Markov chain resulting from observing the two dynamic systems at arrival epochs. We
prove a stronger result: at any step k, H
C(d)
k ≤ H Cˆ(d)k . We prove this using the following coupling:
1. Upon arrival of an H agent we flip a biased coin with probability (1 − pH)d. If the coin flip
is head, the H agent cannot start a chain-segment, and both H
C(d)
k+1 and H
Cˆ(d)
k+1 increment by
one. If the coin flip is tail, the H agent starts a chain-segment in both systems. Suppose
that [H
C(d)
k , E
C(d)
k ] = [h, e] and H
Cˆ(d)
k = h˜, and let [L
H
[h,e], L
E
[h,e]] denote the random number of
H and E agents in the chain-segment formed under C(d) at state [h, e]; similarly let Sh˜ be
the length of chain-segment formed under Cˆ(d) at state (h˜). We dinstinguish between three
cases:
(a) h˜ ≥ h and the event {Sh˜ < (h˜−h)} occurs: we let [LH[h,e], LE[h,e]] be realized independently
of Sh˜.
(b) h˜ ≥ h and the event {Sh˜ ≥ (h˜−h)} occurs. In this case the memoryless property of Cˆ(d)
in (10) can be rewritten as: P[Sh˜ = i | Sh˜ ≥ (h˜− h)] = P[Sh = i− (h˜− h)]. This divides
the chain-segment formation into two independent events: a subchain-segment of length
(h˜−h) is formed, and then a subchain-segment of length ξ, where ξ is a random variable
drawn from the distribution of Sh.
Now we focus on the chain-segment formation under C(d). Because H agents get a higher
priority, the chain-segment can be computed in steps. Starting with [h, e] agents, we first
look for a subchain-segment LH1 consisting of only H agents. When this chain-segment
cannot be continued further with only H agents, we look for an E agent to continue the
chain. If this happens (with probability (1 − (1 − pE)e), we look for a second subchain-
segment LH2 of only H agents, etc.
Note that the first subchain-segment LH1 also has the same distribution as Sh. We can
therefore set LH1 = ξ. All further subchain-segments L
H
i are realised independently.
(c) h˜ < h: we let [LH[h,e], L
E
[h,e]] and Sh˜ be realized independently.
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2. Upon arrival of an E agent we flip a biased coin with probability (1−pE)d. If the flip is head,
the E agent cannot start a chain-segment in either system and we have: H
C(d)
k+1 = H
C(d)
k , and
32This case is only defined here for the sake of completeness, the induction will ensure that this never happens.
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H
Cˆ(d)
k+1 = H
Cˆ(d)
k ; on the other hand, if the flip is tail, the E agent starts a chain-segment in
both systems. The chain-segment formation in this case is exactly the same as the one for an
H arrival.
Having the above coupling, we finish the proof by induction: The base case k = 0 is trivial:
H
C(d)
0 = H
Cˆ(d)
0 = 0. Suppose H
C(d)
k ≤ H Cˆ(d)k holds for k, we show that it also holds for k + 1: if
an H/E arrival does not start a chain-segment then by coupling construction H
C(d)
k+1 ≤ H Cˆ(d)k+1 . If
an H arrival does start a chain-segment then we are either in Case (1a) or (1b). In the former the
length of the chain-segment in Cˆ(d) was not even long enough to bring the number of H agents back
to H
C(d)
k = h; therefore H
C(d)
k+1 ≤ H Cˆ(d)k+1 holds. In the latter case, again by coupling construction
LH[h,e] ≥ Sh + (h˜ − h), which implies that H
C(d)
k+1 ≤ H Cˆ(d)k+1 holds. A similar argument holds if an E
arrival starts a chain-segment.
The next proposition computes E[H Cˆ(d)] in the limit. Together with Lemma 3, this completes
the proof of Theorem 3.
Proposition 5. Under Cˆ(d) and in steady-state, the expected number of H agents satisfies:
lim
pH→0
pHE[H
Cˆ(d)] = ln
(
1 +
λH
λE(1− (1− pE)d)
)
.
Proof. Let pi be the steady-state probability distribution. By the conservation of flow from state h
to h+ 1, we have:
pi(h)λH(1− pH)d =
∑
k≥1
pi(h+ k)
∑
i≤h
QCˆ(d)(h+ k, i)
 .
Note that
∑
i≤hQ
Cˆ(d)(h + k, i) is the total leftward flow starting from state h + k and ending at
state i ≤ h. Using (8) and (9), we have:∑
i≤h
QCˆ(d)(h+ k, i) = ΛP[Sh+k ≥ k],
and therefore,
pi(h)λH(1− pH)d = Λ
∑
k≥1
pi(h+ k)P[Sh+k ≥ k]. (11)
Observe that applying Definition (9), we have P[Sh+k ≥ k] = P[Sh+k ≥ k − 1]P[Sh+1 ≥ 1].
Therefore we can rewrite (11) as:
pi(h)λH(1− pH)d = Λ
pi(h+ 1)P[Sh+1 ≥ 1] + P[Sh+1 ≥ 1]∑
k≥2
pi(h+ k)P[Sh+k ≥ k − 1]
 . (12)
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Similarly we write the conservation of flow from state h+ 1 to h+ 2:
pi(h+ 1)λH(1− pH)d = Λ
∑
k≥1
pi(h+ 1 + k)P[Sh+k+1 ≥ k] = Λ
∑
k′≥2
pi(h+ k′)P[Sh+k′ ≥ k′ − 1],
(13)
where the last step follows from a change of variable k′ = k+1. Note that the summation in the RHS
of (13) also appears in the second term of RHS of (12). Substituting
∑
k′≥2 pi(h+k
′)P[Sh+k′ ≥ k′−1]
with pi(h+ 1)λH(1− pH)d/Λ in (12) gives that
pi(h)λH(1− pH)d = pi(h+ 1)P[Sh+1 ≥ 1]
(
Λ + λH(1− pH)d
)
. (14)
We can now compute E[H Cˆ(d)] by proving an upper and lower bound separately. We use the
fact that for states far enough from the expectation, the distribution decays geometrically. We
start with the upper-bound. Let η = ln
(
1 + λH
λE(1−(1−pE)d)
)
/pH + 1/
√
pH . We know from (9) that
P[Sh+1 ≥ 1] = 1− (1− pH)h+1. This implies that for h ≥ η,
P[Sh+1 ≥ 1] ≥ 1− (1− pH)η+1
= 1− e(η+1) ln(1−pH)
= 1− λE(1− (1− pE)
d)
λH + λE(1− (1− pE)d)(1−
√
pH) + o(pH),
where we used the Taylor expansion ln(1− x) = −x− x2/2− x3/3− . . ..
Using (14) for h ≥ η, we have:
pi(h+ 1)
pi(h)
=
λH(1− pH)d
P[Sh+1 ≥ 1] (Λ + λH(1− pH)d)
≤ λH(1− pH)
d
λH + λE(1− (1− pE)d)√pH + o(
√
pH)
= 1− c√pH + o(√pH) =: δ,
(15)
where c = λE(1−(1−pE)
d)
λH
. Having (15), we upper bound E[H Cˆ(d)] as follows:
E[H Cˆ(d)] =
∑
h≤η+p−3/4H
pi(h) +
∑
h≥η+p−3/4H +1
pi(h)
≤ η + p−3/4H + pi(η)
δp
−3/4
H +1
(1− δ)
=
ln
(
1 + λH
λE(1−(1−pE)d)
)
pH
+ o(1/pH).
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Similarly we lower bound E[H Cˆ(d)]: let ηˆ = ln
(
1 + λH
λE(1−(1−pE)d)
)
/pH−1/√pH , we can find cˆ such
that for h ≤ ηˆ:
pi(h)
pi(h+ 1)
≤ 1− cˆ√pH + o(√pH)
The above inequality combined with Markov inequality enables us to lower bound E[H Cˆ(d)] as
follows:
E[H Cˆ(d)] ≥ (η − p−3/4H )
1− η−p
−3/4
H∑
h=0
pi(h)
 = ln
(
1 + λH
λE(1−(1−pE)d)
)
pH
+ o(1/pH).
Finally, note in the special case pE = 1, an arriving E agent is matched immediately by a bridge
agent, implying that E
C(d)
t = 0 and H
C(d)
t = H
Cˆ(d)
t ; consequently Proposition 5 implies the limit
stated in Proposition 1.
6 Final comments
In matching markets where monetary transfers are not allowed, exogenous thickness increases
exchange opportunities (Roth (2008)). Using a simple dynamic model with heterogeneous agents
we find a tight connection between market thickness and the desired matching technology; matching
through chains is significantly more efficient than (simple) bilateral matching only when the market
is sufficiently thin. Furthermore, increasing the arrival rate of hard-to-match agents may have,
under bilateral matching, an adverse effect on such agents who will face a harsher competition for
matching with easy-to-match agents.
An important dynamic matching market is kidney exchange, which enables incompatible
patient-donor pairs to exchange donors. While our stylized model abstracts away from many
details in this market, our findings may provide some useful insights to policy issues. When
merging markets, which is an ongoing effort in various countries (see Section 2.1), or attracting
different types of pairs, there may be negative effects on some pairs. This effect is well known
for pairs with O patients and non-O donors who compete to match with scarce O donors in the
pool (Roth et al. (2007)); our findings suggest that this negative effect extends also to blood-type
compatible pairs (like O-O), many of which have very highly sensitized patients. Understanding
these externalities are a key step towards aligning incentives towards cooperation between the
relevant players (Ashlagi and Roth (2012)). Our findings further provide some insights about
tradeoffs from prioritizing different types of pairs.
Next we discuss some limitations and possible extensions. One interesting challenge is to quan-
tify the exact loss from restricting attention to myopic policies that do not wait before matching,
rather than finding the optimal Markovian policy that may make some agents wait in order to
increase matching opportunities. 33 Another interesting direction is to extend the model to allow
departures.34 Finally, our focus has been on marketplaces, in which any pair of agents have a
33Similar to Anderson et al. (2017) we can show our policies achieve the same scaling as the best anonymous
Markovian policy (see Proposition 9 in Appendix G) but characterising the best constants is an open question.
34For example, Akbarpour et al. (2014) allow agents to depart prior to being matched and consider the match rate
as the measure for efficiency.
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non-zero probability of forming a match. We found that the composition of the market crucially
impacts the efficiency of the market. An interesting direction for future research would be to extend
this study to two-sided marketplaces, in particular explore what features determine waiting times;
for example, whether it is more beneficial to be on the short side or have a large ex ante match
probability.
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A Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. Let pi(x, y) be the state joint distribution of [X,Y ], and let piX(x) =∑
y≥0 pi(x, y) be the marginal distribution of X. For a given x ≥ 0, we have:∑
y∈S(x)
pi(x, y)Q([x, y], [x+ 1, y]) +
∑
y 6∈S(x)
pi(x, y)Q([x, y], [x+ 1, y])
=
∑
y∈S(x+1)
pi(x+ 1, y)Q([x+ 1, y], [x, y]) +
∑
y 6∈S(x+1)
pi(x+ 1, y)Q([x+ 1, y], [x, y]).
Using Condition 2, we upper-bound the LHS and lower-bound the RHS, which results in having:
f(x)P[X = x, Y ∈ S(x)] + P[X = x, Y 6∈ S(x)] ≥ g(x+ 1)P[X = x+ 1, Y ∈ S(x+ 1)].
Let piS(x) = P[X = x, Y ∈ S(x)] =
∑
y∈S(x) pi(x, y). Observe that piX(x) ≤ piS(x) + cδx ≤
piS(x) + cρ
x from Condition 1 and for any ρ ∈ [δ, 1). Assuming that for x ≥ η, f(x)g(x+1) ≤ ρ , we get:
piS(x+ 1) ≤ f(x)
g(x+ 1)
piS(x) +
P[Y 6∈ S(x)]
g(x+ 1)
≤ ρpiS(x) + cδ
x
g(x+ 1)
≤ ρpiS(x) + cρ
x
g(η + 1)
,
where the last inequality results from the assumption δ
x
g(x+1) ≤ ρ
x
g(η+1) . We can now prove by
induction that:
piS(η + i) ≤ ρi
(
piS(η) + i
cρη−1
g(η + 1)
)
This allows us to conclude:
P[X ≥ η + k] =
∞∑
i=η+k
piX(i)
≤
∞∑
i=k
piS(η + i) +
∞∑
i=k
cρη+i
≤
∞∑
i=k
ρipiS(η) +
cρη−1
g(η + 1)
∞∑
i=k
iρi +
∞∑
i=k
cρη+i
≤ ρ
k
1− ρ
(
1 + cρη +
cρη−1
g(η + 1)
k + 1
1− ρ
)
≤ ρ
k
1− ρ
(
1 + c+
c(k + 1)
g(η + 1)− f(η)
)
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B Missing proofs for BilateralMatch(H) Policy
In the proofs of this section and of the next ones we will use the following facts: for any bounded,
non-negative function ξ : R+ 7→ R+ and any constant u > 0, in the limit where pH → 0,
Fact 1. For η = (lnu)+ξ(pH)
p2H
, we have (1− p2H)η = e
−ξ(pH )
u +O(p
2
H).
Fact 2. For any constants pE, r > 0 and for η =
(lnu)+ξ(p)
p2H
, we have (1− pEpH)η = o(prH).
Fact 3. For any constant pE, and for η =
(lnu)+ξ(pH)
pEpH
, we have (1− p2H)η = 1−O(pH).
Fact 4. For any constant pE and for η =
(lnu)+ξ(p)
pEpH
, we have (1− pEpH)η = e−ξ(p)u +O(pH).
B.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. We first upper-bound E[HBH ]. Let
v(λH , λE , pE , pH) =
{
1
pEpH
(
ln
(
λE
λE−λH
)
+ c3
√
pH
)
+ p
−3/4
H when λH < λE ,
1
p2H
(
ln
(
2λH
λE+λH
)
+ c4
√
pH
)
+ p
−3/4
H when λH > λE .
Where c3 and c4 are the constants from Proposition 4. Using the equality E[H
BH ] =
∑∞
i=1 P[H
BH ≥
i], we have:
E[HBH ] =
v(λH ,λE ,pE ,pH)−1∑
i=1
P[HBH ≥ i] +
∞∑
i=v(λH ,λE ,pE ,pH)
P[HBH ≥ i]
≤ v(λH , λE , pE , pH) +
∞∑
j=p
−3/4
H
γ(pH)
j
1− γ(pH)
≤ v(λH , λE , pE , pH) + γ
′′(pH)p
−3/4
H
(1− γ′′(pH))2 .
Where we denote γ′′ = max(γ, γ′) and we used the result from Proposition 4 : P[HBH ≥
v(λH , λE , pE , pH) + j] ≤ γ
′′(pH)j
1−γ′′(pH) .
Applying the fact that γ′′(pH)p
−3/4
H =
(
1−√pH + o(√pH)
)p−3/4H = o(p2H), and some algebra we
get the following upper-bound on E[HBH ]:
- If λH < λE , then E[H
BH ] ≤ ln
(
λE
λE−λH
)
pEpH
+ o
(
1
pH
)
.
- If λH > λE , then E[H
BH ] ≤ ln
(
2λH
λH+λE
)
p2H
+ o
(
1
p2H
)
.
Now we proceed to lower-bound E[HBH ]: Applying Markov inequality to E[HBH ] and using Propo-
sition 3, we get the following lower-bound on E[HBH ]:
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- If λH < λE , then E[H
BH ] ≥ ln
(
λE
λE−λH
)
pEpH
+ o
(
1
pH
)
.
- If λH > λE , then E[H
BH ] ≥ ln
(
2λH
λH+λE
)
p2H
+ o
(
1
p2H
)
.
This completes the proof.
B.2 Proof of Corollaries 1 and 2
Proof of Corollary 1. Define x = λH/λE , and f(x) =
ln( 11−x)
x . Note that the constant
ln
(
λE
λE−λH
)
pEλH
=
f(x)
λEpE
. It is easy check that f ′(x) > 0 in x ∈ (0, 1), and therefore f(x) is increasing in x ∈ (0, 1).
Proof of Corollary 2. Define y = λH/λE , and g(y) =
ln
(
2y
1+y
)
y . Note that the constant
ln
(
2λH
λH+λE
)
λH
=
g(y)
λE
. It is easy to check that g′(y) > 0 when y ∈ (1, y∗), and g′(y) < 0 in y > y∗ where y∗ is the
solution of g′(y) = 0:
g′(y∗) = 0⇔ 1
y∗ + 1
= ln
(
2y∗
1 + y∗
)
⇔ (y∗ + 1) ln(2− 2/(y∗ + 1)) = 1,
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Instead of proving Proposition 4, we prove a stronger result. This will be useful later on to prove
an upper bound for E agents (see Lemma 4 in B.4).
Proposition 6. Under BH , if λH < λE, for any non-negative bounded function ξ(pH), for all
k ≥ 0:
P
[
HBH ≥ 1
pEpH
(
ln
(
λE
λE − λH
)
+ ξ(pH)
)
+ k
]
≤ γ(pH)
k
1− γ(pH) ,
where γ(pH) =
λH
λE−(λE−λH)e−ξ(pH ) +O(pH).
If λH > λE, for any non-negative bounded function ξ
′(pH), for all k ≥ 0:
P
[
HBH ≥ 1
p2H
(
ln
(
2λH
λE + λH
)
+ ξ′(pH)
)
+ k
]
≤ γ
′(pH)k
1− γ′(pH) ,
where γ′(pH) = e
−ξ′(pH )
2−e−ξ′(pH ) +O(p
2
H).
Proof. We wish to apply Lemma 2 with [X(t), Y (t)] = [HBH (t), EBH (t)], in the special case where
S(h) = N for all h, and c = δ = 0. This implies that we need to find functions f(·) and g(·) such
that for all e ∈ N, f(h) ≥ QBH ([h, e], [h+ 1, e]), and g(h) ≤ QBH ([h, e], [h− 1, e]).
Let f(h) = λH(1− p2H)h and g(h) = λH(1− (1− p2H)h) + λE(1− (1− pEpH)h). We have
f(h)
g(h+ 1)
=
λH(1− p2H)h
λH(1− (1− p2H)h+1) + λE(1− (1− pEpH)h+1)
.
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Case λH < λE: Take η =
1
pEpH
(
ln
(
λE
λE−λH
)
+ ξ(pH)
)
. Facts 3 and 4 imply respectively that
(1− p2H)η = 1 +O(pH) and (1− pEpH)η = λE−λHλE e−ξ(pH) +O(pH). This yields for all h ≥ η:
f(h)
g(h+ 1)
≤ λH
λE − (λE − λH)e−ξ(pH)
+O(pH) := γ(pH).
Case λH > λE: Taking η =
1
p2H
(
ln
(
2λH
λE+λH
)
+ ξ′(pH)
)
. Facts 1 and 2 imply respectively (1 −
p2H)
η = λE+λH2λH e
−ξ′(pH) +O(p2H) and (1− pEpH)η = o(p2H). This yields for all h ≥ η:
f(h)
g(h+ 1)
≤
1
2e
−ξ′(pH)
1− 12e−ξ′(pH)
+O(p2H) := γ
′(pH).
In both cases, we conclude by applying Lemma 2 with ρ = γ(pH) or ρ = γ
′(pH) .
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof of Proposition 4 is a consequence of Proposition 6:
- In the case where λH < λE , take ξ(pH) =
√
pH
λH
λE−λH . This implies that
γ(pH) =
λH
λE−(λE−λH)e−ξ(pH ) +O(pH) = 1−
√
pH +O(
√
pH).
- In the case where λH > λE , take ξ
′(pH) = 2
√
pH . This implies that γ
′(pH) = e
−ξ′(pH )
2−e−ξ′(pH ) +
O(p2H) = 1−
√
pH +O(
√
pH).
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
The proof of Proposition 3 requires a concentration bound on the number of E agents, which we
state in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. Under BH , and assuming pH ≤ pE, there exist constants C and ζ < 1 (which only
depend on λH , λE , and pE) such that for any k ≥ 0, there exists p such that for any pH < p, we
have:
P
[
EBH ≥ 1√
pH
+ k
]
≤ Cζk.
Proof. The proof is based on a bound on the right-tail distribution of E agents in the market.
To do this, we will apply Lemma 2 with [X(t), Y (t)] = [EBH (t), HBH (t)]. Therefore, we find an
upper-bound f(e) = λE(1− p2E)e ≥ QBH ([h, e], [h, e+ 1]) on the upward transition (3c). Similarly,
we would like to find a lower-bound g(e) on the downward transition (3d), but we cannot find one
for any h ∈ N. Therefore we need to restrict our attention to some subset S(e) ⊂ N. Recall that
QBH ([h, e], [h, e− 1]) = λH(1− p2H)h(1− (1− pEpH)e) + λE(1− pEpH)h(1− (1− p2E)e)).
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Case λH < λE:
S(e) =
{
h ∈ N | h ≤ 1
pEpH
(
ln
(
λE
λE − λH
)
+ ln 2
)
+ e
}
.
Applying Proposition 6 with ξ(pH) = ln 2, we get that P[H
BH 6∈ S(e)] ≤ γ(pH)e1−γ(pH) = cδe, where
c = λH+λEλE−λH , δ =
2λH
λE+λH
. Fact 4 implies that for all h ∈ S(e), (1− pEpH)h ≥ λE−λH2λE (1− pEpH)e +
O(pH). Keeping only the second term in Q
BH ([h, e], [h, e− 1]), we get the lower-bound:
QBH ([h, e], [h, e− 1]) ≥ λE − λH
2
(1− pEpH)e(1− (1− p2E)e) +O(pH) := g(e)
This yields:
f(e)
g(e+ 1)
=
2λE
(λE − λH)(1− (1− p2E)e+1)
(
1− p2E
1− pEpH
)e+1
+O(pH).
We get for all e ≥ 1√pH , and pH small enough,
f(e)
g(e+1) ≤ δ. Furthermore, for ρ = 1+δ2 and pH small
enough,
δe
g(e+ 1)
≤ δe (1− pEpH)
1√
pH
−e−1
g( 1√pH + 1)
≤
(
δ
1− pEpH
)e 1
g( 1√pH + 1)
≤ ρ
e
g( 1√pH + 1)
We can apply Lemma 2 which yields the desired bound:
P
[
EBH ≥ 1√
pH
+ k
]
≤ ρ
k
1− ρ
(
1 + c+
c(k + 1)
g( 1√pH + 1)− f( 1√pH )
)
≤ ρ
k
1− ρ
(
1 + c+
c(k + 1)(λH + λE)
2λHg(1/
√
pH + 1)
)
.
≤ ρ
k
1− ρ
(
1 + c+
c(k + 1)(λH + λE)
λH(λE − λH)
)
.
Where we used first the fact that
f(1/
√
pH)
g(1/
√
pH+1)
≤ δ = 2λHλE+λH and therefore g(1/
√
pH + 1) −
f(1/
√
pH) ≥ λE−λHλE+λH and second the fact that g(1/
√
pH + 1) =
λE−λH
2 +O(pH).
Case λH > λE:
S(e) =
{
h ∈ N | h ≤ 1
p2H
(
ln
(
2λH
λE + λH
)
+ ln 2
)
+ e
}
.
Applying Proposition 6 with ξ(pH) = ln(2), we have P[H
BE 6∈ S(e)] ≤ γ(pH)e1−γ(pH) = cδe, with c = 3/2
and δ = 1/3. Fact 1 implies that for all h ∈ S(e), (1− p2H)h ≥ λH+λE4λH (1− p2H)e +O(p2H). Keeping
only the first term in QBH ([h, e], [h, e− 1]), we get the lower-bound:
QBH ([h, e], [h, e− 1]) ≥ λH + λE
4λH
(1− p2H)e(1− (1− pEpH)e) +O(p2H) = g(e).
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This yields:
f(e)
g(e+ 1)
≤ 4λHλE
(λH + λE)(1− (1− pEpH)e)
(
1− p2E
1− p2H
)e
+O(p2H).
Furthermore, with ρ = 1/2 we get that for pH small enough,
δ
1−p2H
≤ ρ. This leads to
δe
g(e+ 1)
≤ δe (1− p
2
H)
p
−1/2
H −e
g
(
p
−1/2
H + 1
) ≤ ( δ
1− p2H
)e 1
g
(
p
−1/2
H + 1
) ≤ ρe
g
(
p
−1/2
H + 1
) .
Therefore we can apply Lemma 2:
P
[
EBH ≥ nE + k
] ≤ ρk
1− ρ
1 + c+ c(k + 1)
g
(
p
−1/2
H + 1
)
− f(p−1/2H )

≤ ρ
k
1− ρ
(
1 + c+
c(k + 1)3
2g(p
−1/2
H )
)
≤ ρ
k
1− ρ
(
1 + c+
6c(k + 1)
λH + λE
)
Where we used the fact that for all e ≥ 1√pH ,
f(e)
g(e+1) = o(pH). Therefore for pH small enough,
f(e)
g(e+1) ≤ 13 and therefore g(e+ 1)− f(e) ≥ 23g(e+ 1). Which concludes the proof.
We can now prove Proposition 3. The main idea is to apply Lemma 1, in two cases separately,
where in one case we have few (≤ 2√pH ) E agents, and in the other case where we have many. Using
Lemma 4, we can exponentially bound the second case.
Proof of Proposition 3. We will apply Lemma 1. Consider S =
{
e ∈ R, e ≤ p−1/2H + p−1/2H
}
. Using
Lemma 4 with k = p
−1/2
H , we get that P[E
BH 6∈ S] = o(p4H).
For e ∈ S, we have (1−pEpH)e ≥ 1−pEpH
(
p
−1/2
H + p
−1/2
H + o(
√
pH)
)
= 1−2pE√pH+o(√pH).
Taking f(h) = λH(1−p2H)h
(
1− 2pE√pH
)
+o(
√
pH), we have for e ∈ S, QBH ([h, e], [h+1, e]) ≥ f(h).
Let g(h) = QBH ([h, e], [h− 1, e]) = λH(1− (1− p2H)h) + λE(1− (1− pEpH)h), and note that f(h)
is non-increasing and g(h) is non-decreasing. We have:
g(h+ 1)
f(h)
=
λH + λE − λH(1− p2H)h+1 − λE(1− pEpH)h+1
λH(1− p2H)h
(
1− 2pE√pH + o(√pH)
)
In the case λH < λE , Take η =
1
pEpH
(
ln
(
λE
λE−λH
)
− c′1
√
pH
)
. Using Facts 3 and 4, we have
(1− p2H)η = 1 +O(pH) and (1− pEpH)η = λE−λHλE ec
′
1
√
pH +O(pH) =
λE−λH
λE
(1 + c′1
√
pH + o(
√
pH)),
therefore:
g(η + 1)
f(η)
=
λH + λE − λH − (λE − λH)(1 + c′1
√
pH) + o(
√
pH)
λH
(
1− 2pE√pH
)
+O(pH)
= 1−
(
λE − λH
λH
c′1 − 2pE
)√
pH + o(
√
pH).
= 1−√pH + o(√pH).
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Where we fixed c′1 =
λH(1+2pE)
λE−λH . Using Lemma 1 with [X(t), Y (t)] = [H
BH (t), EBH (t)], k = p−3/4H
and ρ = g(η+1)f(η) , we get ρ
k = o(p2H) and:
P[HBH ≤ η − k] ≤ η · o(p4H)
(
1 +
1
f(η)− g(η + 1)
)
+
ρk
1− ρ
≤ η · o(p4H)
(
1 +
1
f(η)
√
pH + o(
√
pH)
)
+
o(p2H)√
pH + o(
√
pH)
= o(pH).
Taking c1 = c
′
1+pE , this enables us to conclude that P[H
BH ≤ 1pEpH
(
ln
(
λE
λE−λH
)
− c1p1/4H
)
] ≤
o(pH).
In the case λH > λE , Let η =
1
p2H
(
ln
(
2λH
λH+λE
)
− c′2p1/4H
)
. Using Facts 1 and 2, we have (1−p2H)η =
λH+λE
2λH
ec
′
2p
1/4
H +O(p2H) and (1− pEpH)η = O(p2H). This implies that:
ρ =
g(η + 1)
f(η)
=
(λH + λE)− (λH+λE)2 ec
′
2
√
pH +O(p2H)
(λH+λE)
2 e
c′2
√
pH
(
1− 2pE√pH
)
+O(p2H)
=
2− (1 + c′2
√
pH)
(1 + c′2
√
pH)(1− 2pE√pH) + o(
√
pH)
= 1− (2c′2 − 2pE)
√
pH + o(
√
pH)
= 1−√pH + o(√pH).
Where we have chosen c′2 =
1+2pE
2 . Taking k = p
−3/4
H , we have ρ
k = o(p2H). Applying Lemma 1,
we get that for all :
P[HBH ≤ η − k] ≤ η · o(p4H)
(
1 +
1
f(η)− g(η + 1)
)
+
ρk
1− ρ
= η · o(p3H) +
o(p2H)
f(η)
√
pH + o(
√
pH)
= o(pH)
Taking c2 = c
′
2 + 1, this enables us to conclude that P[H
BH ≤ 1
p2H
(
ln
(
2λH
λH+λE
)
− c2√pH
)
] ≤
o(pH).
C Missing proofs for BilateralMatch(E) Policy
The proof of Theorem 2 relies on a concentration result on the left tail of the distribution of HBE
(Proposition 7), and a coupling argument to upper-bound E[HBE ] (Proposition 8).
Proposition 7. [Lower Bound] Under BE in steady-state,
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- If λH < λE, there exist a function γ(pH) = 1 − √pH + o(√pH) and a constant c5 ≥ 0 such
that for all k ≥ 0:
P
[
HBE ≤ 1
pEpH
(
ln
(
λE
λE − λH
)
− c5p1/4H
)
− k
]
≤ γ(pH)
k
1− γ(pH) .
- If λH > λE, there exist a function γ
′(pH) = 1 −√pH + o(√pH) and a constant c6 ≥ 0 such
that for all k ≥ 0:
P
[
HBE ≤ 1
p2H
(
ln
(
2λH
λH + λE
)
− c6√pH
)
− k
]
≤ γ
′(pH)k
1− γ′(pH) .
Proposition 8. [Upper-bound] Under BE and in steady-state,
- If λH < λE, then E[H
BE ] ≤ ln
(
2λE
λE−λH
)
pEpH
+ o
(
1
pH
)
- If λH > λE, then E[H
BE ] ≤ 1
p2H
ln
(
2λH
λH+λE
)
+ o
(
1
p2H
)
.
Proof of Theorem 2. We will first compute a lower bound for E[HBE ]: Applying Markov inequality
to E[HBE ] and using Proposition 7 with k = p−3/4H , we get the following lower-bound on E[H
BE ]:
- If λH < λE , then E[H
BE ] ≥ ln
(
λE
λE−λH
)
pEpH
+ o
(
1
pH
)
.
- If λH > λE , then E[H
BE ] ≥ ln
(
2λH
λH+λE
)
p2H
+ o
(
1
p2H
)
.
Using Proposition 8, we can get the desired upper-bounds for E[HBE ]. We can conclude using
Little’s law: wH =
E[HBE ]
λH
.
C.1 Proof of Proposition 7.
In order to prove Proposition 7, we first need a concentration result on EBE agents. This is stated
in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. Under BE in steady-state, for any α ∈ [0, 1], let nE(α) = ln(α/(1+α(1−p
2
E))
ln(1−p2E))
. For any
k ≥ 0, we have:
P
[
EBE ≥ nE(α) + k
] ≤ αk
1− α.
Also, (1− p2E)nE(α) = α1+α(1−p2E) .
Proof. In the same way that upper-bounding H agents when they get priority is easy because
waiting E agents can be ignored, upper-bounding the number of E agents is easy when they get
the priority because H agents can be ignored. We can get the following bounds on the transition
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probabilities: QBE ([h, e], [h, e+ 1]) ≤ λE(1− p2E)e = f(e), and QBE ([h, e], [h, e− 1]) ≥ λE(1− (1−
p2E)
e) = g(e) which leads to:
f(e)
g(e+ 1)
=
(1− p2E)e
1− (1− p2E)e+1
.
Setting η = nE(α) to be the solution to
f(n)
g(n+1) = α, and applying Lemma 2 with [X(t), Y (t)] =
[E(t), H(t)], and S(e) = N for all h, c = 0 and δ = 0, we get the desired result.
We can now prove Proposition 7.
Proof of Proposition 7. Notice that QBE ([h, e], [h + 1, e]) = QBH ([h, e], [h + 1, e]), therefore the
function f(h) = λH(1−p2H)h
(
1− 2pE√pH
)
+ o(
√
pH) used in the proof of Proposition 3 remains a
lower bound for e ∈ S =
{
e ≤ 2p−1/2H
}
. Furthermore, QBE ([h, e], [h− 1, e]) ≤ QBH ([h, e], [h− 1, e])
therefore the function g(h) = λH(1− (1− p2H)h) + λE(1− (1− pEpH)h) remains an upper bound.
Therefore, the proof is exactly the same as the proof for the lower bounds for Proposition 3,
except that instead of Lemma 4 we use Lemma 5 in the special case nE(α) = p
−1/2
H with S ={
e ∈ R, e ≤ 2p−1/2H
}
, and k = p
−1/2
H . We still have, P[E
BH 6∈ S] = o(p4H).
C.2 Proof of Propostion 8
This proof is based on a coupling argument: instead of analysing the CTMC resulted from BE ,
we analyse the CTMC underlying another process that we call B˜E . B˜E works similarly to BE
with one crucial difference: each time an E agent arrives which cannot be matched immediately,
it changes type and becomes an H agent and then joins the market. First note that under B˜E , no
E agent joins the market, making its underlying CTMC a 1-dimensional Markov chain. Proving
that the stochasitc process underlying B˜E is a positive recurrent CTMC, and therefore it reaches
steady-state is similar to the proof of positive recurrence of BE (See Claim 2) and therefore omitted.
Using a coupling argument we show that in steady-state number of H agents under BE can be
upper-bounded by the number of H agents under B˜E . Our motivation behind defining B˜E is that
in BE , unmatched E agents in the market are competing against H agents over whom they have
priority. The idea is that by turning unmatched E agents into H ones, we expect to have more H
agents waiting. Let H B˜E be the random number of H agents under B˜E in steady-state. First in the
next lemma we show that E[HBE ] ≤ E[H B˜E ] + 1, then we compute an upper-bound on E[H B˜E ].
Lemma 6. E[HBE ] ≤ E[H B˜E ] + 1.
Proof. Consider two copies of the arrival process, one under the setting of BE and one under B˜E . Let
[HBEk , E
BE
k ] and H
B˜E
k denote the embedded (discrete-time) Markov chain resulting from observing
the two dynamic systems at arrival epochs. We will prove the following (stronger) result: there
exists a coupling such that at any step k, HBEk + E
BE
k ≤ H B˜Ek + 1.
We start by coupling all arrivals: with probability λHλE+λH (
λE
λE+λH
), arrivals to BE and B˜E at k
are both H (E) agents. Three cases can happen:
1. HBEk + E
BE
k < H
B˜E
k ; in this case, we let the two chains evolve independently.
2. H B˜Ek ≤ HBEk + EBEk ≤ H B˜Ek + 1. Let h = H B˜Ek . We consider two sub-cases:
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(a) The arrival at k + 1 is an H agent. We couple the events that B˜E and BE cannot find
a match as follows: we draw two independent Bernoulli random variables B1, B2 with
respective parameters of (1 − p2H)h and (1 − p2H)H
BE
k (1 − pHpE)E
BE
k (1− p2H)−h. B1 = 1
corresponds to the event that B˜E cannot find a match; similarly B1B2 = 1 corresponds
to the event that BE cannot find a match.
(b) The arrival at k+1 is an E agent. Similarly we couple the events that B˜E and BE cannot
find a match as follows: we draw two independent Bernoulli random variables B3, B4
with respective parameters of (1−pEpH)h and (1− pEpH)H
BE
k (1− p2E)E
BE
k (1− pEpH)−h.
B3 = 1 corresponds to the event that B˜E cannot find a match. Similarly B3B4 = 1
corresponds to the event that BE cannot find a match.
3. HBEk + E
BE
k > H
B˜E
k + 1; in this case, we let the two chains evolve independently.
Having the above coupling, we finish the proof by induction. The base case k = 0 is trivial:
HBE0 +E
BE
0 = H
B˜E
0 = 0. Suppose H
BE
k +E
BE
k ≤ H B˜Ek + 1, we show that HBEk+1 +EBEk+1 ≤ H B˜Ek+1 + 1:
In Case (1), note that the number of agents waiting can increase or decrease by at most 1. For
both cases, we have HBEk+1 + E
BE
k+1 ≤ H B˜Ek+1 + 1. In Case (2a), we have:
- If B1 = 0, then H B˜Ek+1 = H
B˜E
k − 1. Further if B1 = 0 then B1B2 = 0, and HBEk+1 + EBEk+1 =
HBEk + E
BE
k − 1. Therefore HBEk+1 + EBEk+1 ≤ H B˜Ek+1 + 1
- If B1 = 1, then H B˜Ek+1 = H
B˜E
k + 1. Note that number of agents under BE can increase by at
most one, therefore HBEk+1 + E
BE
k+1 ≤ H B˜Ek+1 + 1.
Similarly in Case (2b), we have:
- If B3 = 0, then H B˜Ek+1 = H
B˜E
k − 1. Further if B3 = 0 then B3B4 = 0, and HBEk+1 + EBEk+1 =
HBEk + E
BE
k − 1; therfore HBEk+1 + EBEk+1 ≤ H B˜Ek+1 + 1
- If B3 = 1, then H B˜Ek+1 = H
B˜E
k + 1. Note that number of agents under BE can increase by at
most one, therefore and HBEk+1 + E
BE
k+1 ≤ H B˜Ek+1 + 1.
Thus, in all possible cases HBEk+1 + E
BE
k+1 ≤ H B˜Ek+1 + 1 finishing the proof. Note that the above
induction also implies that Case (3) never occurs.
Proof of Proposition 8. Observe that the CTMC H B˜Et has the following rate matrix:
QB˜E (h, h+ 1) = λH(1− p2H)h + λE(1− pEpH)h
QB˜E (h, h− 1) = λH(1− (1− p2H)h) + λE(1− (1− pEpH)h)
And let us define:
ρ(h) =
QB˜E (h, h+ 1)
QB˜E (h+ 1, h)
=
λH(1− p2H)h + λE(1− pEpH)h
λH(1− (1− p2H)h+1) + λE(1− (1− pEpH)h+1)
.
44
Note that ρ(h) is a decreasing function, and suppose that there exists η ≥ 0 such that ρ(η) <
1−√pH and let pi = pi(h)h≥0 be the stationnary distribution of H B˜E . Then we have for all i ≥ 0,
pi(η + i) ≤ ρ(η)ipi(η) ≤ ρ(η)i and for all k ≥ 0, P[H B˜E ≥ η + k] ≤ pi(η)∑i≥k ρ(η)i ≤ ρ(η)k1−ρ(η) . We
then have
E[H B˜E ] =
∑
h≥1
P[H B˜E ≥ h]
E[H B˜E ] ≤ (η + k) +
∑
h≥η+k
P[H B˜E ≥ h]
E[H B˜E ] ≤ (η + k) + ρ(η)
k
(1− ρ(η))2
Let us consider the case when λH < λE . Let η =
ln(1/u)+c
√
pH
pEpH
. For h ≥ η, we have (1−pEpH)h ≤
u
(
1− c√pH + o(√pH)
)
and (1−p2H)h ≤ 1− ln(1/u)p2H +o(p2H). We have ρ(η) = λH+λEu(1−c
√
pH)
λE(1−u(1−c√pH)) +
o(
√
pH). Taking u =
λE−λH
2λE
and c = λE+λH2(λE−λH) , we get ρ(η) = 1−
√
pH +o(
√
pH). Taking k = p
−3/4
H
we get:
E[H B˜E ] ≤ η + o(1/pH) =
ln( 2λEλE−λH )
pEpH
+ o(1/pH), λH < λE . (16)
In the case when λH > λE , let η =
ln(1/u)+c
√
pH
p2H
. For h ≥ η, we have (1 − pEpH)h = o(pH) and
(1−p2H)h ≤ u(1−c
√
pH)+o(
√
pH). Taking u =
λH+λE
2λH
and c = 1/2, we get ρ(η) = 1−√pH+o(√pH).
Taking k = p
−3/4
H we get:
E[H B˜E ] ≤ η + o(1/p2H) =
ln( 2λHλE+λH )
p2H
+ o(1/p2H), λH > λE . (17)
Putting Lemma 6 and upper-bounds given in (16) and (17) together finishes the proof.
D Missing proofs for ChainMatch(d) Policy
Proof of Proposition 1. As pointed at the end of Subsection 5.4, when pE = 1, an arriving E agent
is matched immediately by a bridge agent, implying that E
C(d)
t = 0 and H
C(d)
t = H
Cˆ(d)
t ; consequently
Proposition 5 implies the limit stated in the Proposition 1.
Further note that fixing λH , it is straightforward to check that function f(λE) =
ln
(
λH
λE
+1
)
λH
is
decreasing for λE > 0. Similarly fixing λE , it is straightforward to check that function g(λH) =
ln
(
λH
λE
+1
)
λH
is decreasing for λH > 0.
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Proof of Corollary 3. First we observe that ln
(
λH
λE(1−(1−pE)d) + 1
)
is decreasing in d. Therefore the
worst upper-bound on w
C(d)
H is for d = 1. Next we show that:
ln
(
λH
λEpE
+ 1
)pE
≤ ln
(
λH
λE
+ 1
)
≤ ln
(
λH
λE − λH + 1
)
,
where the first inequality holds because function f(x) := (λH/λEx +1)
x is increasing in x ∈ (0, 1].
Proof of Proposition 2. In steady-state, for any function f(·, ·), 0 = E[f(Hk, Ek)− f(Hk+1, Ek+1)],
and in particular for f(h, e) = h+ e, we get
0 = (λH(1− pH)d + λE(1− pE)d)E[Hk + Ek −Hk+1 − Ek+1|Hk + Ek < Hk+1 + Ek+1]
+ (λH(1− (1− pH)d) + λE(1− (1− pE)d))E[Hk + Ek −Hk+1 − Ek+1|Hk + Ek ≥ Hk+1 + Ek+1]
= −(λH(1− pH)d + λE(1− pE)d) + (λH(1− (1− pH)d) + λE(1− (1− pE)d))E[L− 1 | L ≥ 1].
(18)
This gives us:
E[L | L ≥ 1] = λH(1− pH)
d + λE(1− pE)d
(λH(1− (1− pH)d) + λE(1− (1− pE)d)) + 1 =
λH + λE(1− pE)d
λE(1− (1− pE)d) + 1 + o(1).
E Heuristic argument for ChainMatch(d) Policy
In what follows we provide a heuristic analysis of the CTMC underlying the ChainMatch(d). This
heuristic adds intuition for the behavior of the policy and further establishes what is supposedly
the right constant in the case in which our theory only generates an upper bound (pE < 1).
We introduce an auxiliary 3-dimensional CTMC, in which a chain-segment is not formed in-
stantaneously; instead a chain-segment can only advance at certain “tokens” (or times) that arrive
according to a Poisson process with rate µ35. We denote this auxiliary CTMC by C˜(d, µ) and its
states by [H
C˜(d,µ)
t , E
C˜(d,µ)
t , Ut] ∈ N2 × {0, 1}. The first two dimensions represent the number of
H and E agents. The third dimension Ut indicates whether a chain-segment is being conducted.
Initially U0 = 0. Suppose at time t1 the first agent i arrives that is matched by an altruistic agent.
At this time Ut1 becomes 1 indicating that a chain-segment formation is in process. The policy
waits x unit of time for a token to arrive to find an agent who can be matched by i (note that
x is exponentially distributed with rate µ)36. If such an agent does not exist, then chain-segment
35This process is independent from the Poisson processes guiding the arrivals of H and E agents.
36Note that it is possible that there is a new arrivals of H and/or E agents in the interval (t1, t1 + x]. In this
heuristic, we assume that the arriving H or E agent is deleted. The intuition is that when µ is large, this event
happens rarely.
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is stopped; and Ut1+x becomes 0. Otherwise Ut1+x remains 1 and the same process repeats. The
transition rates of C˜(d, µ) are:
QC˜(d,µ)([h, e, 0], [h+ 1, e, 0]) = λH(1− pH)d (19a)
QC˜(d,µ)([h, e, 0], [h, e+ 1, 0]) = λE(1− pE)d (19b)
QC˜(d,µ)([h, e, 0], [h, e, 1]) = λH(1− (1− pH)d) + λE(1− (1− pE)d) (19c)
QC˜(d,µ)([h, e, 1], [h, e, 0]) = µ(1− pH)h(1− pE)e (19d)
QC˜(d,µ)([h, e, 1], [h− 1, e, 1]) = µ
(
1− (1− pH)h
)
(19e)
QC˜(d,µ)([h, e, 1], [h, e− 1, 1]) = µ(1− pH)h (1− (1− pE)e) (19f)
[h, e, 0] [h+1, e, 0][h-1, e, 0]
[h, e, 1]
[h+1, e, 1][h-1, e, 1]
......
......
λH(1− pH)dλH(1− pH)d
λH(1− (1− pH)d)
+λE(1− (1− pE)d)
µ(1− pH)h(1− pe)e
µ
(
1− (1− pH)h+1
)
µ
(
1− (1− pH)h
)
Figure 10: Transitions for the CTMC underlying C˜(d, µ) in the first and third dimensions, i.e,
transitions to states with a different number of E agents are not shown. Transition rates are given
only for solid arrows.
Figure 10 illustrates the transitions of C˜(d, µ) in H C˜(d,µ)t and Ut dimensions along with the
transition rates. The rate (19a) ((19b)) corresponds to the event that an H (E) agent arrives but
cannot be matched by any bridge agent which happens with probability (1 − pH)d ((1 − pE)d).
The rate (19c) corresponds to the case an H arrives and starts a chain-segment (occurs with
probability (1−(1−pH)d)) or an E agent arrives and starts a chain-segment (occurs with probability
(1 − (1 − pE)d); similarly (19d) represents the case where the chain-segment cannot advance any
further (happens with probability (1 − pH)h(1 − pE)e). The last two rates correspond to adding
one more H and E agent to the chain-segment respectively (with probability
(
1− (1− pH)h
)
and
(1− pH)h (1− (1− pE)e) respectively).
Similar to the heuristic argument for BilateralMatch(H) and BilateralMatch(E), we can try to
solve the following system of nonlinear equations (that result from setting expected drifts in all
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three dimensions to be zero):
E
[(
λH(1− (1− pH)d) + λE(1− (1− pE)d)
)
I(U = 0)− µ(1− pH)H C˜(d,µ)(1− pE)EC˜(d,µ)I(U = 1)
]
= 0
E
[
λE(1− pE)dI(U = 0)− µ(1− pH)H C˜(d,µ)(1− (1− pE)EC˜(d,µ))I(U = 1)
]
= 0
E
[
λH(1− pH)dI(U = 0)− µ(1− (1− pH)H C˜(d,µ))I(U = 1)
]
= 0,
where I(·) is the indicator function. We find that ln
(
λH+λE
λH(1−(1−pH)d)+λE
)
/pH is an approximate
solution for E[H C˜(d,µ)]. Further, note that in C˜(d, µ) if anH/E agent arrives while a chain-segment is
being formed then the agent will not join the market. However, probability of such an event vanishes
as µ → ∞ (i.e, forming chain-segments becomes instantaneous). Therefore, it is reasonable to
approximate E[HC(d)] with limµ→∞E[H C˜(d,µ)], and thus with ln
(
λH+λE
λH(1−(1−pH)d)+λE
)
/pH . Finally
note that:
lim
pH→0
ln
(
λH + λE
λH(1− (1− pH)d) + λE
)
= ln
(
λH + λE
λE
)
,
which is the constant in Proposition 1.
We emphasize that the analysis above is only a heuristic for guessing the right constant when
pE < 1. We refer the reader to Section 4.5 for numerical simulations that show the tightness of
this constant.
F Positive recurrence proofs
To prove existence of a stationary distribution, we use a special case of a result from Meyn and
Tweedie (1993), as stated in Prieto-Rumeau and Herna´ndez-Lerma (2016).
Theorem 4 (Meyn and Tweedie (1993)). Suppose that Xt is an irreducible continuous time Markov
chain, and suppose that there exist a nonnegative function V on S, a function w ≥ 1 on S, a finite
set C ⊂ S, and constants c > 0 and b ∈ R such that∑
j∈S
qijV (j) ≤ −cw(i) + b · IC(i) for all i ∈ S,
where IC denotes the indicator function of the set C. Then the Markov chain X is ergodic.
It is clear that all four markov chains are irreducible, so our proofs will focus on finding a
suitable set C and function V for each case.
F.1 Positive recurrence of BH and BE.
Claim 1. The CTMC [HBHt , E
BH
t ] defined in (3a), (3b), (3c), (3d), is positive recurrent.
Proof. Let V ([h, e]) = h + e. Observe that for a continuous time random walk, we can write for
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any state i = [h, e]:∑
j∈N2
qi,jV (j) =
∑
j 6=i
qi,j(V (j)− V (i))
= Q([h, e], [h+ 1, e])−Q([h, e], [h− 1, e]) +Q([h, e], [h, e+ 1])−Q([h, e], [h, e− 1]).
= λH(1− p2H)h(1− pEpH)e − λH(1− (1− p2H)h)− λE(1− (1− pEpH)h)+
λE(1− pEpH)h(1− p2E)e − λH(1− p2H)h(1− (1− pEpH)e)− λE(1− pEpH)h(1− (1− p2E)e))
= 2λH(1− p2H)h(1− pEpH)e − λH + 2λE(1− pEpH)h(1− p2E)e − λE .
Take M(pH) such that (1 − p2H)M(pH) = 13 , and let C = {[x, y] s.t. x+ y ≤ 2M(pH)}, note
that C is finite. For any [h, e] 6∈ C, either h ≥ M(pH) or e ≥ M(pH). In both cases, we have∑
j∈N2 qi,jV (j) ≤ −λH+λE3 .
Claim 2. The CTMC [HBEt , E
BE
t ] defined in (5a), (5b), (5c), (5d) is irreducible and positive
recurrent.
The proof follows similar ideas as Claim 1.
F.2 Positive recurrence of C(d) and Cˆ(d)
Claim 3. Under C(d), the number of H and E agents [HC(d)t , EC(d)t ] is a positive recurrent CTMC.
Proof. Similarly to the proof of Claim 1, let V ([h, e]) = h+ e, and C = {[x, y] s.t. x+ y ≤ 2M} for
an appropriately chosen M . Consider a state [h, e] 6∈ C, and assume first that h ≥ M . Denoting
Λ = λH(1− pH)d + λE(1− pE)d, we have:∑
j∈N2
qi,jV (j) = Λ− (λH + λE − Λ)
∑
[kH ,kE ]≤[h,e]
(kH + kE)P[kH(kE) H (E) agents get matched]
≤ Λ− (λH + λE − Λ)
∑
[kH ]≤[h,e]
kHP[kH H agents get matched]
≤ Λ− (λH + λE − Λ)
∑
k≤h
h−k∏
i=h
(1− (1− pH)i)
≤ Λ− (λH + λE − Λ)
∑
k≤M/2
(1− (1− pH)M/2)k
Going from the second to the third inequality bounds the number of agents matched with the
number of agents matched in the first sub-chain-segment (before matching an E agent). Because
the function M →∑k≤M/2(1 − (1 − pH)M/2)k tends to infinity as M grows large, we can find M
such that
∑
j∈N2 qi,jV (j) ≤ −1, which concludes the proof.
The case where h < M and e ≥ M can be treated similarly using the following observation:
every-time the chain cannot match to any H agent, it tries to match an E, and it succeeds with
probability 1− (1− pE)e irrespective of h. Put together, these events constitute a set of E agents
that are matched sequentially, and the total length of the chain is more than the number of E
agents selected in that way.
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Claim 4. H
Cˆ(d)
t is a positive recurrent CTMC.
The proof follows similar arguments as that of Claim 3.
G Lower Bound
Definition 3. We call a matching policy anonymous Markovian if matching decisions are made at
arrival epochs, and only depend on the current compatibility graph Gt = (Vt, Et), and are anonymous
among agents of the same type. In that case, the market Gt is a continuous-time Markov chain.
We say that an anonymous Markovian policy P is stable if the resulting Markov chain is
ergodic and has a stationary distribution. In line with our previous notation, we denote wPH (w
P
E)
the expected stationary waiting times for H and E agents under policy P.
Remark. Observe that all the matching policies described in this paper are anonymous Markovian.
Proposition 9. For any pE ∈ [0, 1], λH > 0, λE ≥ 0, there exists a constant c such that for any
pH > 0, under any stable anonymous Markovian matching policy P, wPH + wPE ≥ cpH .
The proof follows ideas used in Anderson et al. (2017). The main intuition is the following:
Suppose the market size is too small, then an arriving agent has to wait a long time to obtain at
least one incoming edge. This long waiting time contradicts the small market size (with Little’s
law).
Proof. In this proof, we fix a Markovian policy P, and we will omit the superscript notations.
Observe that under P, the market Gt only evolves at arrival epochs, and we can analyze the
embedded discrete-time Markov chain resulting from observing the system at arrival epochs which
we denote by Gi. Let n = E[|V|] = E[H] + E[E] be the expected size of the market in steady-state.
Let us denote θ = λHλH+λE , and let wˆH be the expected number of (discrete) time steps that an H
agent arriving in steady-state has to wait before getting matched. Little’s law for discrete Markov
chains implies that wˆH = E[H]/θ.
Note that it is enough to prove that there exists a constant k such that n ≥ k/pH (we then
choose c = kmax(λH ,λE)). Let k be a constant to be defined later. Assume for contradiction that there
exists pH such that n < k/pH . Let a be an H agent entering the market in steady-state. Let Va be
the set of agents in the market when agent a arrives. Note that we assumed E[|Va|] = n < k/pH .
Define the event E1 = {|Va| ≤ 3n/θ}. By Markov’s inequality, P[E1] ≥ 1− E[|Va|]θ3n ≥ 1− θ/3.
Let Aa be the first 3n/θ arrivals after a, and let E2 be the event that at least one agent from
Va ∪ Aa has an outgoing edge towards a. We have
P[E2] = P[Bin(|Va|+ |Aa|, pH) ≥ 1].37
Therefore we get:
P[E2|E1] ≤ P[Bin(6n/θ, pH) ≥ 1] ≤ P[Bin(6k/θpH , pH) ≥ 1] ≤ 6k/θ.
37Note that we abuse the notation of Bin(u,p) by allowing its parameters to be random variables. In this case,
conditional on the event |Va| + |Aa| = u, the random variable Bin(|Va| + |Aa|, p) has a binomial distribution with
parameters u and p.
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Where the first inequality derives from the definition of E1, the second uses the fact that n ≤ k/pH
and the third is Markov’s inequality.
We now use the fact that if a does not have any edge from either Va or Aa, then she must wait
longer than 3n/θ time steps.
wˆH ≥ 3n
θ
P[Ec2] ≥
3n
θ
P[Ec2|E1]P[E1] ≥
3n
θ
(1− 6k/θ)(1− θ/3) ≥ 3n
θ
(1− 6k/θ)(2/3).
Thus we get:
n ≥ E[H] = wˆHθ ≥ 2n(1− 6k
θ
).
Therefore for k = θ24 , we obtain a contradiction.
Observe that similar to Anderson et al. (2017), the above reasoning could be generalized to
the case of periodic Markovian policies (see Definition 2 of Anderson et al. (2017)) which includes
batching polices with constant batch size.
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